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A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUE OF
PRO BONO PUBLICO
REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR:
THE GOOD AS THE ENEMY OF THE
BEST
LE MIEUX EST L’ENNEMI DU BON.
FRENCH PROVERB
ROB ATKINSON*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Professor Carle’s symposium has given us a superb chance to
reflect on the past and future of pro bono publico representation,1
particularly as a means of meeting the legal needs of the poor.2  But
                                                          
        * Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.  My particular thanks to Susan
Carle, organizer of this conference, and to its sponsor, the Washington College of Law at
American University.  Russell Pearce’s comments on my draft and suggestions for further
research were far more generous than his job as the conference’s formal commentator could
reasonably have required.  Kristen Hatcher-Bollen, Susan Avellone, and Jed Freeland provided
invaluable research assistance; my friends Sandy D’Alemberte, Stephanie Gamble, and Mark
Seidenfeld, gave me their usual encouragement and support, including occasional criticism and
correction.  Deborah Rhode and David Luban, with whose views on the subject at hand I
substantially differ, generously granted me the status of loyal opposition and offered most
collegial responses.
1. No such reflection would be complete without reference to the magisterial study, now
nearly a decade old but still invaluable, by Ronald H. Silverman, Conceiving a Lawyer’s Legal Duty
to the Poor, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 885 (1991), which itself surveys the first generation of mandatory
pro bono proposals, id. at 888-95.
2. For measures of those needs, see Report of the Florida Bar, FLORIDA BAR FOUNDATION
JOINT COMMISSION ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE INDIGENT IN FLORIDA (1991);
CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC OF THE ABA, COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS
SURVEY (1993); Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal
Services Final Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York (April 1990), reprinted in, The Crisis of
Unmet Civil Legal Needs, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 771-79 (1991); see also RICHARD L. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS 128 (1989) (“Lawyers have long been cognizant of the gross inequalities
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whenever I reflect along those lines, I’m driven to a sense of paradox,
if not a mood of pessimism; particularly here, in this scholarly
celebration of pro bono lawyering, I feel a bit like the skunk--or at
best the ant--at the picnic.  Nowhere is my ambivalence better
captured than in the French aphorism I’ve taken as my epigraph: the
best is the enemy of the good.
A. Defining the Spectrum of Solutions: The Best, the Good, and the Bad
To be frank (no pun intended), I’m convinced that pro bono
representation is a decidedly second-best means of delivering legal
services to the poor.3  It is, to be sure, a good thing--much better than
nothing--but not the best.  To my way of thinking, the best would be a
dramatically expanded system of publicly-paid lawyers for the poor.4
                                                                                                                                     
that characterize the distribution of legal services.”); Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1121 (1991) (“But informed observers agree that there remains a
tremendous unmet need, estimated at 75% to as much as 95% of the total legal needs of the
poor.”) (citations omitted); Bruce A. Green, Foreword: Rationing Lawyers: Ethical and Professional
Issues in the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1713, 1713 (1999)
(“By now, it is a commonplace observation that many people in this country cannot afford a
lawyer . . . .”); Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right
Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78, 86 (1990) (pointing to “the existence of several recently completed,
empirically sound studies which demonstrate the gap between legal resources and unmet legal
needs”) (citations omitted); Honorable Sol Wachtler, Introduction: Symposium on Mandatory Pro
Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 739, 739 (1991) (quoting Marrero Committee, infra note 5, at 774,
that “our society has evolved so that the poor need legal help to obtain basic human
requirements and to an appalling degree cannot get it”).  But see John C. Scully, Mandatory Pro
Bono: An Attack on the Constitution, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1229, 1234-35 (1991) (criticizing
methodology of needs assessments cited in Marrero Committee Report).
3. See Wachtler, supra note 2, at 740 (“Mandatory pro bono is at best an inefficient way to
deliver the very specialized kind of legal services that poor people need.”).
4. I am thankfully not alone in this assessment.  See id. (“Indeed, almost everyone who has
joined the debate about mandatory pro bono . . . agrees that the best way to provide legal
services to the poor is to increase funding for legal services and other social programs.”);
Cramton, supra note 2, at 1136 (“A more desirable alternative to mandatory pro bono, in my
view, is an increase in public funding of civil legal assistance for the poor and a deregulation of
the marketplace for services that would provide more low-cost alternatives.”); Marrero
Committee Report, infra note 5, at 779 (“In the long run . . . it is likely that higher public
appropriation for full-time professional legal services would be the most effective answer to the
need.”); see also Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE, Agenda Item # 6: Affirm the Crucial Role of Public
Funding for Legal Services that Provide Access to Justice for Low-Income Persons (1996).
      I should point out, however, that I am not at all convinced that lawyers employed by the
government agencies or affiliates are preferable to private lawyers paid from public funds.  For
a recap of that debate and a useful overview of sources, see Silverman, supra note 1, at 1032-37;
see also SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, JUDICARE: PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS AND POOR PEOPLE (1974)
(evaluating quality of service among legal aid programs in Wisconsin, Montana and upper
Michigan).  Indeed, I find myself moved toward Silverman’s conclusion: “While the subject is
understandably delicate, no effort to evaluate potential institutional changes can avoid
characterizing the current delivery system and its personnel in relatively unflattering terms.”  Id.
at 1055.  See also E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., The American Approach: Public Funding, Law Reform,
and Staff Attorneys, 10 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 207, 210-12 (1977) (summarizing the history of the
American debate over salaried lawyers and judicare).  I lean--again, in quite heartening
company--toward a mix of government-employed lawyers and publicly-subsidized private
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But--here’s the pessimism--we are not going to see any such thing
anytime soon.  And--here’s the paradox--in holding out for the best,
for publicly paid lawyers for the poor, in some distant future, we may
undermine the merely good, pro bono publico representation, in the
here and now.5
In a very real sense, I admit, Utopian idealism can seriously erode
realistic reforms; that is the wholesome kernel of truth inside the
prickly hull of my old French chestnut.  Half a loaf is undeniably
better than no bread, and to insist that the poor will eat cake after the
Revolution is to sound more than a bit reactionary, particularly if they
are to go hungry in the meantime.  But, recognizing that risk, I want
to warn of the opposite danger: dismissing realizable if ambitious
reforms in favor of merely meliorative measures.  For, by proverbial
Gallic logic, the converse of my French proverb may also be true: the
good may be the enemy of the best.6  We must be careful, in other
words, not to hand the poor a half-loaf when fuller measures are
within our common grasp.  And we must be particularly careful if the
half-measure is not especially wholesome, and helps push fuller,
healthier fare farther out of reach.
My thesis, then, is that the good has become the enemy of the best,
unfortunately and unnecessarily.  First, I want to show you why pro
bono, mandatory or voluntary, is merely good, and not even as good
as we have tended to believe.  From this discussion will emerge why a
system of publicly subsidized legal services for the poor is best.
Having thus distinguished the good from the best, I want, in the
second place, to show how the good and the best have been at odds.
In particular, I want to show how current defenses of mandatory pro
                                                                                                                                     
lawyers.  See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY, 272 (1988) [hereinafter
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE] (calling for a mix of judicare, full-time legal aid lawyers, and
other measures) ; see also James Gordley, The Meaning of Equal Access to Legal Services, 10 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 220 (1977) (assessing the relative merits of judicare and staff attorney programs and
recommending a mixed system); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES, STANDARD 5-1.2 (arguing that systems for legal aid to indigent criminal defendants
should include “a full-time defender organization” and “the active and substantial participation
of the private bar”).
5. See Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, Committee To Improve the Availability of Legal Services
Final Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 758-59 (1991)
[hereinafter Marrero Committee Report] (“To hold out indeterminately for the perfect societal
response, to do nothing at all because we can do only a little, is unwise.”).
6. I am, thankfully, not alone in this fear.  Esther F. Lardent reached essentially the same
conclusion a decade ago: “The events of the last decade [the 1980s] strongly suggest that the
heat and light accompanying the mandatory pro bono debate have diverted considerable
resources from the real issue, ensuring access to justice regardless of economic status, without
measurably improving such access.”  Lardent, supra note 2, at 79.  I should point out, in fairness
to Lardent, that we are not in entire agreement.  She is a major proponent and provider of
voluntary pro bono, id. at 79.  I have my doubts about voluntary as well as mandatory pro bono,
see infra text at I.A.
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bono play directly into the hands of those who oppose publicly
subsidized lawyers for the poor.  Finally, I want to propose a way that
the good and the best can be re-aligned, even allied; I would rally
them both behind what I call a Good Samaritan Tax, a steeply
progressive emergency levy on lawyers as the model for expanded
public subsidy of legal representation of the poor from general tax
revenues.
The bottom line, alas, is this: in the short run, we may have no
better recourse than taxing the bar to meet the legal needs of the
poor.  But mandatory pro bono is a most dubious form of tax, in
terms of both efficiency and fairness.  And, what may be worse,  its
current rationales are less than inadequate; they are subversive of the
fairest and most efficient long-run solution, public subsidization.  As
Professor John MacArthur Maguire prophesied in 1923: “Any plan of
doing justice to the poor by doing injustice to the bar will soon
collapse.”7  If only for that reason, we must not sign off on an
emergency plan that burdens lawyers alone without simultaneously
insisting on a much more nearly ideal system in the not too distant
future.8
And, lest you think my quest for the ideal system Quixotic, let me
give my Utopia a name: Europe.  What the right in this country
dismiss as undesirable and what leftists despair of as impossible has
been the accepted reality there for at least a generation.  Our sibling
democracies are well ahead of us in what an American scholar
described two decades ago as:
the pattern of progression in Western countries: “from a lack of
concern for the problems of the legal representation of the poor,
to a concept of personal charity mixed in varying proportions with
notions of professional obligation, to acceptance of an affirmative
duty resting on society as a whole (operating through the state) to
meet the need.9
                                                          
7. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 392 (1923).
8. See Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right
Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 18, 73 (1990) (insisting that the government’s commitment to
increased public funding be “an explicit predicate to a mandatory pro bono program”).
9. David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer’s Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 786
(summarizing the findings of MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1975)); see also MAURO CAPPELLETTI,
JAMES GORDLEY, and EARL JOHNSON, JR., TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 64 (1975) (“The pattern [in the West] is one of struggle
towards realization of the principle that the state must affirmatively and effectively guarantee
the right of all to competent legal assistance, wherever and in whatever form it is needed.”).
What’s more, European law has explicitly held that compelled provision of legal services as
contemplated by typical American schemes of mandatory pro bono are a form of “forced labor”
forbidden by the Convention on Human Rights.  Shapiro, supra, at 787.  See also LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 242-43 (describing the American legal aid system as “a
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One would be foolish, of course, to predict that we Americans will
inevitably follow the rest of the West from the middle phase of this
progression to the final.  Indeed, it would be presumptuous to posit
that we should.  But it would be equally foolish to insist that we
cannot, and deeply at odds with liberal values to pre-suppose that we
should not.  This last claim requires a word of explanation.
B.  Claiming the Common Ground: Three Liberalisms Solving the Same
Problem
Before turning to the subtopics of my central thesis, I should point
out an important matter of perspective.  My critiques of pro bono
representation, voluntary and mandatory, and my defense of publicly
subsidized legal services for the poor are all from a left-liberal
perspective.10  This is particularly significant with respect to my
critique of pro bono.  Others have offered right-liberal or libertarian
critiques of pro bono, particularly mandatory pro bono,11 and illiberal
rightwing critiques, even of voluntary pro bono, could easily enough
                                                                                                                                     
disaster” that is “distinctively American,” in contrast particularly with Western Europe); Rudolf
B. Schlesinger, The German Alternative: A Legal Aid System of Equal Access to the Private Attorney, 10
CORNELL INT’L.J. 213, 217 (1977) (noting, with specific reference to Germany, that “there are
some countries where, at least in litigated matters, indigent parties truly stand on an equal
footing with wealthy litigants.”).
10. More precisely, social democratic.  See Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 213 (noting that the
extensive judicare systems of Germany and Britain were both introduced by social democratic
parties).
11. See Scully, supra note 2, at 1229, 1269 (criticizing mandatory pro bono from the
perspective of “individuals who doubt the claims of the war on poverty or believe that there are
solutions short of using the state to compel service.”); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Mandatory Pro
Bono: Collective Discharge of Duty or Welfare for the Rich, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1116-17 (1992)
(arguing that mandatory pro bono inefficiently requires the poor to expend resources in ways
that probably do not reflect their real preferences, creating artificial demand for legal services).
Cf. Debra Burke, Pro Bono Publico: Issues and Implications, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 73-74 (1994)
[hereinafter Burke, Issues and Implications] (setting out objections based on Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments); Kendra Emi Nitta, An Ethical Evaluation of Mandatory Pro Bono, 29
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 909, 920-21 (1996) (setting out objections based on First and Fifth
Amendments); Debra Burke, Mandatory Pro Bono: Cui Bono?, 25 STETSON L. REV. 983, 999-1006
(1996) [hereinafter Burke, Mandatory Pro Bono] (setting out First Amendment objections);
Scully, supra note 2, at 1244-61 (arguing First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteen Amendment
objections); Shapiro, supra note 9, at 762-77 (reviewing First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendment objections).  See generally Omar J. Arcia, Objections, Administrative Difficulties, and
Alternatives to Mandatory Pro Bono Legal Services in Florida, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 771, 786 (1995)
(arguing mandatory pro bono is both inherently unfair and unfeasible); Jennifer Murray,
Lawyers Do It for Free?: An Examination of Mandatory Pro Bono, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1141, 1143
(1998) (concluding that the infringement on lawyer liberty inherent in mandatory pro bono is
unwarranted in view of the fact that it would not generate enough legal service to meet the
needs of the poor, which in any case are a burden all of society should bear).  For a particularly
scathing denunciation of all forms of compulsory, student “volunteer” work, see Note, Students
or Serfs?  Is Mandatory Community Service a Violation of the Thirteenth Amendment?, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 809, 833-39 (1997).  But see Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 833, 857-61
(reviewing and rejecting federal constitutional objections).
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be inferred.12  My critique does not rest or build upon these.13
Indeed, in what follows, I will take them up only as necessary to
distinguish myself from them or, more importantly, to show how left-
liberal defenses against them tend to undermine a broader and
better left-liberal solution to the core problem, meeting the legal
needs of the poor.
On the other hand, while distinguishing my left-liberal position
from right liberal critiques of pro bono representation, I want to be
careful not to exaggerate the width of the politically relevant
spectrum.  As I set out what I think is the best solution to lack of legal
counsel for the poor, it is important to bear in mind how relatively
close it is to what I believe to be a bad solution.  In the grand scheme
of things, my moderately leftist tax-the-rich-to-spend-for-the-poor
solution is not very far from a modified form of laissez-faire provision
of legal services, supplemented by generous charity on the part of
lawyers and others.  My spectrum of best to bad runs, in other words,
merely from the social democratic left to the neo-classical right.  In
what follows, it is extremely important to note how much common
ground I share with my right-liberal opponents: we all believe in a
vigorous, essentially market economy and a liberal democratic
polity.14  On this particular issue, moreover, we share a common
belief that poverty should not bar anyone from the exercise of basic
civil rights.15
What we differ on, accordingly, is the best means to that end, not
the end itself.  And, even with respect to means, our differences are
not as great as they might at first appear.  At least from my side, I
have no objection in principle to the laissez-faire model.  My basic
objection is not that purely market means are wrong in and of
themselves, but rather that they are bad simply for failing to deliver
                                                          
12. See infra notes 20 and 21.
13. Nor does my paper address constitutional or other technically legal assessments of
mandatory pro bono.  Here I share the view of Silverman, supra note 1, at 955 (“Despite the
inclination of many opponents to argue against mandatory pro bono in rather technical
constitutional terms, the truly important arguments are more accurately characterized as policy
arguments.”) and Cramton, supra note 2, at 1126 (“Although constitutional doubts influence
the discussion by suggesting a cautious approach respectful of the rights asserted, I believe that
the policy issues are likely to be determinative.”).
14. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV.
259, 267 (1995) (outlining common ground of “liberal legalism”) [hereinafter Atkinson, A
Dissenter’s Commentary].
15. See Cramton, supra note 2, at 1113 (“The choice in this instance [for or against
mandatory pro bono] is between relative goods rather than between two disastrous
outcomes.”).  See also ABEL, supra note 2, at 133 (“By 1980 . . . the legal profession (if not the
courts) had come to view civil representation as essential to the liberal ideal of equal justice
under law.”).
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the goods, that is, legal services for the poor.  The purely private
solution, the market supplemental by individual charity, is bad
because it is impractical,16 not because it is in any sense undesirable.
If wishes were lawyers, doubtlessly the poor would be well
represented.
C. Identifying the Outer Darknesses: Dangers Outside the Visible Political
Spectrum
On the liberal political spectrum I thus identify three positions as
to legal services for the poor: the centrist “good” of pro bono
representation, mandatory as well as voluntary; the libertarian “bad”
of private market and pure charity;17 and the left-liberal “best” of tax-
financed public subsidization.  All three, however, must be
understood as competing means to attain an end their respective
proponents, as liberals, all share: getting legal services to the poor in
a system of advanced market capitalism and political democracy.
Stated that way, the common goal has two correlative aspects, one
static, the other dynamic.  The more obvious aspect is the dynamic:
fixing a current social problem, reforming a severe dysfunction in the
market provision of a vital service.  The other, static aspect is less
obvious but equally important: leaving essentially intact our existing
system of market economics and political democracy.  We must be
careful to observe, here at the outset, how removing either of these
aspects, the static or the dynamic, takes us off one end or the other of
the spectrum of liberal politics.
If we remove the dynamic aspect, the explicitly liberal goal of
getting legal services to the poor, we lapse into some form of
illiberalism beyond the libertarian far right of the liberal spectrum.
Out here in the ultra-violet zone, attending to the legal needs of the
poor simply is not a concern.  Rawlsian worries about the “greatest
benefit of the least advantaged,”18 rooted in ancient Judeo-Christian
insistence on service to the poor,19 are nil, if not anathema.  Here we
                                                          
16. See Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 822-31 (citing extensive empirical
evidence that efforts to increase voluntary pro bono provision of legal services have not
succeeded).
17. For a useful, if unsympathetic and Whiggish, historical account of this position, see
CAPPELLETTI,  supra note 9, at  5-27.
18. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971).
19. See Leviticus 19:10 (King James) (“And thou shalt not glean thy vineyard, neither shalt
thou gather every grape of thy vineyard; thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger: I am
the LORD your God.”); Amos 2:6 (King James) (“Thus saith the LORD; For three transgressions
of Israel, and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof; because they sold the
righteous for silver, and the poor for a pair of shoes.”); Matthew 25:40 (King James) (“And the
King [Jesus] shall answer and say unto them, Verily, I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it
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have, for example, both the noble Nietzsche20 and the nutty Ayn
Rand.21  Theirs is not the resigned Devil-take-the-hindmost sight of
Social Darwinism; it is closer to an enthusiastic rooting for the Devil,
if not an actual following in his hoofmarks.
If, on the other hand, we remove the static aspect of the liberal
goal, preservation of a market economy and a political democracy, we
lapse into some form of illiberalism beyond the civic republican or
communitarian far left of the liberal spectrum.  Out here in the
radical, infra-red zone, capitalism and pluralism are not sacrosanct,
but near the root of the problem of poverty; indeed, of virtually all
evil.22  It is sobering to remember that, within seven years of the Soviet
suppression of the Prague Spring, an academic authority could write
in a book on legal aid, “In Russia, where laissez-faire ideas had never
genuinely taken hold, a new vision was [embraced taken] from the
writings of Karl Marx, and Russia was eventually joined by other
countries of Eastern Europe.”23  “Joined,” indeed.
As my thoroughly tendentious spectrum suggests, I find these two
extremes, the far left and the far right, deeply troubling.  Nor do I
find it particularly comforting that some of them, some of the time,
ally themselves with their nearest neighbors in the liberal middle on
meeting the legal needs of the poor (or, for that matter, on any other
matter).  Thus radical communitarians may well call for mandatory
pro bono representation, even mandatory student pro bono24
(despite their distaste for liberal education);25 similarly, Randian
egoists may well join in libertarian opposition to mandatory pro bono
(though not, of course, in libertarian calls for private charity).
Either of these extremes is, I submit, substantially worse than
anything in the liberal middle.  But I choose the comparative
advisedly here, to reserve the ultimate “worse” for later.  Though the
                                                                                                                                     
unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.”).
20. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Random House 1967)
(1887) (warning against “the instincts of pity, self-abnegation, [and] self sacrifice” as “the great
danger to mankind, its sublimest enticement and seduction”).
21. See AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 32 (1964) (“Parasites, moochers, looters,
brutes and thugs can be of no value to a human being--nor can he gain any benefit from living
in a society geared to their needs, demands and protection, a society that treats him as a
sacrificial animal and penalizes him for his virtues in order to reward them for their vices, which
means: a society based on the ethics of altruism.”).
22. See generally ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
23. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 9, at 28.  In fairness to the co-authors, I should point out that
this passage appears in a separate section written by Cappelletti, and that the co-authors
explicitly announced their intention to let each “reflect[] his particular perspective.”  Id. at xii.
24. Indeed, they may call, even more insistently, for publicly subsidized legal services.
25. See UNGER, supra note 22.
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goals of these extremists are, I am convinced, much worse than the
shared goal of all liberals, from left to right, at least these extremists
have one thing going for them: Their motives may well be pure; they
may really believe in the justice or virtue of their illiberal ends.
That, alas, is not true of the very worst, the most dastardly and the
most dangerous.  To identify them, we have to rise above (or, if you
prefer, sink below) the political spectrum altogether.  Up (or down)
here we find the apparatchiks and unprincipled egoists.26  They are,
as the Puritan poet Milton said of his time-serving co-religionists in
the first great liberal revolution, “hireling wolves whose gospel is their
maw.”27  What’s worse, these wolves may well appear in sheeps’
clothing, as proponents of the good, even the best--but only so long
as it is politically expedient.28  Their motto is, mutatis mutandi, the
boast of the Vicar of Bray, notorious time-server during England’s
Puritan Revolution; that “[H]e has accommodated himself to the
religious views of the reigns of Charles, James, William, Anne, and
George and that, whatever king may reign, he will remain Vicar of
Bray.”29  They may often be our allies, but they can never be our
friends.
And this is the worst of the worst: There may be no tell-tale hint of
insincerity about them; they may deceive themselves as thoroughly as
they deceive others. As George Eliot acutely observed, “the egoism
which enters into our theories does not affect their sincerity; rather,
the more our egoism is satisfied, the more robust is our belief.”30  Like
                                                          
26. I have also issued this warning in the broader context of the contemporary
professionalism movement.  Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary supra note 14, at 264; see also
Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A “Public Assets” Theory of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Obligations, 145 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1245, 1245 n.5 (1997) (“We recognize that no amount or quality of argument will
win over lawyers who object to pro bono plans on purely monetary grounds.”).
27. John Milton, Sonnet XVI, To the Lord General Cromwell (May 1652), in PARADISE REGAINED
THE MINOR POEMS AND SAMSON AGONISTES 378, 378 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., The Odyssey Press
1937) (1652).
28. Cf. Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 812 (suggesting that opponents of
mandatory pro bono may “disingenuously” overstate concerns about the competence of
compulsory service).
29. George Orwell, A Good Word for the Vicar of Bray, in SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT 166, n.1
(1950).  The good Vicar’s contemporary on the Scottish side of those parlous times was Baillie
the Covenanter, immortalized in an essay by Carlyle.  See Thomas Carlyle, Baillie the Covenanter,
in ESSAYS 112 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1950).  But their particular mode of amorality was not
perfectly wedded with shameless self-promotion until the next century, and across the English
channel, in the person of Talleyrand, who managed to serve not only the French Revolution, in
all its various permutations, including Bonapartisme, but also the restored Bourbons.  Carlyle’s
account, is, as usual, as good as any, and a good deal more colorful than most.  See generally
THOMAS CARLYLE, 1 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 129 (London, Chapman & Hall Ltd.
1837).  As the great Carlyle said of the egregious Talleyrand, “A man living in falsehood, and on
falsehood; yet not what you can call a false man: Have is the specialty!”
30. GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH: A STUDY OF PROVINCIAL LIFE  (Alfred E. Knopf ed.
1930).
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Woody Allen’s Zelig,31 such a person simply becomes whatever is most
advantageous at any particular time to be, automatically adopting the
prevalent political colors with all the camouflaging skill of a
chameleon.  You can only know them for what they are after they
have betrayed you--usually by their insistence that their apparent
treachery was really for some higher cause, or your own good.  But
long before that--indeed, as soon as they become what they truly are--
they stand under the highest moral condemnation: “This last is the
highest treason, to do the right thing for the wrong reason.”32
 II.  QUESTIONING THE GOODNESS OF THE GOOD IN LIGHT OF THE
BEST:  A LEFT-LIBERAL CRITIQUE OF PRO BONO REPRESENTATION
Within that spectrum of political positions, let us now narrow our
focus back to the debate among conscientious leftist and centrist
liberals over pro bono representation.
A.  Voluntary Pro Bono
All along the liberal political spectrum, virtually everyone33 agrees
that voluntary pro bono representation is a good thing.34  The ABA’s
1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended, proclaim
that “A lawyer should aspire to render at least fifty (50) hours of pro
bono publico legal services per year.”35  Those who think that this
goes far enough tend to emphasize the virtue of voluntariness;36 those
who would like to go further tend to see legally uncoerced pro bono
as morally superior on precisely this account.37
It is all too easy to scoff at the ABA’s position that the pro bono
obligation it announces should not be legally enforceable, as if the
notion of a legally non-binding duty were inherently contradictory or
                                                          
31. ZELIG (Orion Pictures 1983).
32. T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL (1935).
33. But not, of course, those outside that spectrum; doubtlessly followers of Ayn Rand, at
least some disciples of Nietzsche, and the more rigorous of Social Darwinists would object to
any assistance voluntary or otherwise to those less well off than oneself.
34. See Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2415, 2425 (1999) (“However the controversy over mandatory pro bono
service is resolved, there is ample reason to encourage greater voluntary contributions.”)
[hereinafter Rhode, Cultures of Commitment].
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1983).
36. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 2, at 1133 (“The better view embraces the preference of
private choice over public mandate.”).
37. Wachtler, supra note 2, at 743 (“Most importantly, voluntary service is preferable to
compulsory service in any endeavor.”).  Other proponents of mandatory pro bono--including
the committee Judge Wachtler appointed to study the issue--have pointed to serious flaws in
voluntary systems.  See infra text p. 118-23.
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automatically hypocritical.38  Many obligations of the highest moral
order are of precisely this character; they are binding on the
individual as a moral person, though not enforceable by organs of
the state as a matter of law.39  To take only the most obvious, the
Judeo-Christian summation of the entire moral law--love God with
your whole being, and your neighbor as yourself40--is exactly of this
order.  Indeed, it could plausibly be argued that the ABA’s asserted
duty to provide pro bono representation to the poor is implied by the
second, if not the first, of these religious duties.
The voluntariness of the current regime is perhaps its most salient
feature.  But a second, more basic aspect is hidden by its very
obviousness: The individual lawyer’s asserted obligation to provide
for the legal needs of the poor is to be fulfilled in kind.  Lawyers, that
is, are to pay these particular social dues with their labor, not with
their money.  As the debate on mandatory pro bono has made clear,
this is hardly the only way that a lawyerly obligation to serve the poor
might be met.  As an alternative to giving one’s professional labor,
one could contribute the usual fruit of that labor, money.  But this
alternative is distinctly disfavored by proponents both of the
voluntary regime and of mandatory pro bono.41  Their reason reveals
                                                          
38. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 788 (“Though the distinction between enforceable
obligation and aspiration has been overlooked by some eminent people [in the debate on pro
bono representation], I believe it is an important one that should not evaporate.”) (citations
omitted).
39. See David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58, 58-59 (1999) [hereinafter
Luban, Faculty Pro Bono] (arguing, in Kantian terms, that pro bono is a moral though not a legal
obligation).
40. Leviticus 19:18 (enjoining love of neighbor); Deuteronomy 6:4-5 (enjoining love of God);
Matthew 22: 34-40; Mark 12:28-34; Luke 10:25-28.
41. See A.B.A. Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, Implementing the Lawyer’s Public
Interest Practice Obligation, 63 A.B.A. J. 678, 679 (1977); The Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Recommendation and Report of the Special Committee on the Lawyer’s Pro Bono
Obligations, Toward a Mandatory Contribution of Public Service by Every Lawyer at 17-20
(1979); Lubet & Stewart, supra note 26, at 1301-07; see also Chesterfield H. Smith, Sixth Annual
Baron de Hirsh Meyer Lecture Series; Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard--Its Time Has Come!, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 727, 731 (1981) [hereinafter Mandatory Pro Bono Standard] (“Despite the fact that
for some attorneys contributing cash is far more practical than contributing time, personal
time--that priceless and unique measure of personal devotion--remains the best contribution an
attorney can make to the public interest.”).
      The Marrero Committee Report tried to have it both ways.  It justified a narrow buy-out
provision in its proposal, on the one hand, on the grounds that “the primary aim of its plan was
to improve the availability of legal services to the poor and thereby also enhance the
administration of justice,” supra note 5, at 802.  On the other hand, it rejected a broad buy-out
option on the basis of its belief in the “inherent value to individual lawyers and to the
profession in having some pro bono legal services provided individually.”  Id. at 805.  It should
be noted that this ambivalence on the part of advocates for the poor has not always been the
case.  One of the earliest and most illustrious proponents of private legal aid, Reginald Haber
Smith, emphatically called for lawyers to donate their money as well as their time, without
expressing any preference for the latter.  R.H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 233 (1919)
[hereinafter JUSTICE]; see also R.H. SMITH, BALANCING THE SCALES 22-26 (1976) (noting the
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something absolutely fundamental about virtually all present and
proposed forms of pro bono representation: they are designed to be
good not only for the receiver, but also for the provider.42
Proponents of pro bono identify several goods that accrue to the
providers of pro bono services one seems to be a sense of moral
uplift, the good feeling that most proponents believe (or hope) will
(or should) follow from doing the right thing.43  But the most widely
cited good, principally recommended for the uninitiated, is
education, in any one of several senses.  It is sometimes said, in
essence, that one who provides pro bono services to the poor will
learn how the other half really lives.44  Along the same lines, it is
suggested that, once one sees how badly off the needy really are, one
will want to pitch in even more.  If one does, presumably, one will
then receive even more of the blessedness that is the giver’s primary
entitlement and reward.45
But in-kind provision of any service, legal representation included,
poses problems for both the giver and the receiver, problems that are
simply the mirror images of each other.  From the perspective of the
giver, the problem has been anciently recognized: in matters of
charity, the right hand should not know what the left hand does.46  In
                                                                                                                                     
efforts of Smith and other early leaders of the legal aid movement to encourage financial
contributions from the bar and individual lawyers).
42. See Burke, Mandatory Pro Bono, supra note 11, at 998 (“[N]either collective satisfaction
nor buy-out options should be prohibited [under mandatory pro bono plans] unless the only
goal is to require attorneys to serve individually for their own edification.”); Shapiro, supra note
9, at 782 (“The only argument I can see for the exaction of services without any alternative is
that it is good for the professional soul of the draftee--that he will benefit from the exaction
because it has made him a better and more understanding person.”) (citations omitted).  But cf.
Lubet and Stewart, supra note 26, at 1304-06 (arguing that the presence of high-profile lawyers
in lower-echelon courts, where the poor generally appear, raises the level of practice there).
43. See Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 34, at 2420 (arguing that the benefits
flowing to lawyers themselves from pro bono service “extend beyond the intrinsic satisfactions
that accompany public service.”).
44. See id. at 2420 (“Because lawyers occupy such a central role in our governance system,
there is also particular value in exposing them to how the system functions, or fails to function,
for the have-nots.”); see also LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 282 (“Pro bono
practitioners have a better chance to understand and represent the interests of members of an
entirely different social class and background from most lawyers and their clients; to gain
insights into the day-to-day problems of the poor (and of those who adopt their interests), to
‘see around one’s own corner.’”).
45. This analysis omits a third possible beneficiary: those who impose the obligation.  See
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 782 (“And certainly there is little to be said for imposing the service
obligation solely to increase the satisfaction of those who are doing the imposing.”).  This
possibility forms the basis of several trenchant criticisms of mandatory pro bono.  See Arcia,
supra note 11, at 787 (“One must wonder why it is that those who most vehemently petitioned
the Supreme Court of Florida to adopt a program of organized voluntary pro bono, and
undoubtedly those who may soon petition the court for a mandatory system, are the members
of elite groups within the legal community.”); Macey, supra note 11.
46. Matthew 6:3.
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the mild words of the medieval Jewish sage Maimonides, a distinctly
better charity is triply anonymous: Neither the giver nor the receiver
knows the other, nor does anyone else.47  By contrast, when the lawyer
delivers legal services directly to the needy client, anonymity on both
the donor and donee side is lost.  Perhaps, in the older and sterner
words of the Christian Gospels, those who practice their charity in
public view already have their reward.48
Ironically, that is precisely what some, but by no means all,
proponents of voluntary pro bono systems like that of the ABA’s
Model Rules have in mind.  One does not have to be completely
cynical to suspect that at least one intended function of Model Rule
6.1’s call for morally obligatory but legally unenforced pro bono is
window dressing, part of the bar’s image-polishing campaign in an
era of apparently rampant lawyer-bashing.49  We have their own word
on it.50
Nor would it be cynical in the slightest to point out that, in the
considered opinion of many, voluntary pro bono is the preferred
alternative not only to mandatory pro bono, but also to state-
subsidized legal services.51  Like the conscientious opponents of
expanded state responsibility in the last century, they believe that
voluntary relief by the helping hands of private individuals is
preferable to public provision through the anonymous and coercive
arm of the state.52  To put their position in terms of my epigram,
                                                          
47. MOSES MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, excerpted in JACOB R. MARCUS, THE JEWS IN THE
MEDIEVAL WORLD 364-65 (1938).  Not everyone, apparently, would entirely agree.  Cf. Council
Wooten, Jr. & John M. Kest, Legal Services for Those in Need: Every Lawyer’s Duty, 30 TRIAL 53, 55
(July 1994) (suggesting, in the words of another commentator, Arcia, supra note 11, at 777 n.50,
that “the smile of a child, a heartfelt ‘thank you’ of a mother, or the firm handshake of a man
who is a little better-off is a sufficient incentive for all attorneys to engage in pro bono.”).
48. Matthew 6:2.
49. Cf. Lubet & Stewart, supra note 26, at 1262 (“. . . image repair, no matter how desirable,
cannot provide the rationale for the establishment of a compulsory pro bono obligation.”);
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 789 (conceding that pro bono work may improve the bar’s image, but
concluding that does not “justify compulsory service”).  See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Why the
ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981); Richard L.
Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981) [hereinafter Rhode,
Perspectives on Professional Codes].
50. Not always, I should point out, without ambivalence.  Cf. Rhode, Perspective on
Professional Codes, supra note 49, with Rhode, Fordham.
51. See Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 823 (“Some proponents of voluntarism
seem to regard lawyers’ public interest service as individual charity.”) (emphasis added).
52. See Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing Public Interest
Law in America 42 (noting widespread fears in the 1950s “that if the private bar did not respond
to the need to provide legal representation to the poor, the federal government might,”
particularly in view of the adoption of “judicare” in Britain) (1976); see also Shapiro, supra note
9, at 790 (“A persistent theme in the call for increased public service is the perceived danger of
state control, and even of the ‘socialization’ of the practice of law, if the need is not met by
lawyers acting on their own.”) (citations omitted).  The ABA, a pretty good proxy for centrist,
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voluntary pro bono over against state funding of legal services is not
the good in opposition to the best; it is the best as alternative to the
bad, if not the worst.
This is not the place to try to refute that position.  (My own view,
adumbrated above, is that it is bad simply because it won’t work.)  But
two things about it warrant our attention here.  First, it has not,
traditionally at least, been the position of the secular left.  Thus, for
secular leftists who espouse this position, it is worth wondering whom
you’re marching with, and toward--or away from--what.  Moreover,
even in terms of traditional religious ethics, this approach has a
serious problem.  In this respect, Marx and other critics of traditional
charity in the nineteenth century merely borrowed a page from
Maimonides’s charitable account book, particularly the recipient’s
side of the ledger.  Harkening back, knowingly or not, to his call for
anonymous charity, they pointed out that having the poor receive
their relief directly from private benefactors engenders a degrading
sense of beholdeness.  It is hard not to get the feeling that those who
extend the hand that does the feeding expect it to be kissed,
preferably from a kneeling position.  And note, too, what else
Maimonides implicitly recognized: this sense of beholdeness on the
part of the recipient of charity is not altogether good for the giver,
either.53
Nor are all the progressive arguments against voluntary pro bono
strictly moral.  Some of the more telling are economic.  Most
basically, contributions in kind, all things being equal, may be much
less efficient than contributions in cash.54  Stated somewhat crudely,
contributions in kind tend to require more social resources for a
desired level of need or want satisfaction than equivalent
contributions in cash.  At this point the securities lawyer always makes
his or her appearance in debates on pro bono representation.55  The
                                                                                                                                     
establishment opinion, passed a resolution in 1950 opposing any government role in providing
legal services to the poor, id., a position that was not to be reversed for a decade and a half,
when the ABA endorsed the fait accompli of legal aid provisions in President Johnson’s Great
Society programs.  See Council for Public Interest Law, supra at 50.
53. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 244 n.1 (Allen W. Wood ed.,
H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge University Press 1991) (1821) (“The disposition of the master
over the slave is the same as that of the slave . . . These two sides, poverty and wealth, thus
constitute the corruption of civil society.”).
54. See Russell F. Settle & Burton A. Weisbrod, Financing Public Interest Law: An Evaluation of
Alternative Financing Arrangements, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 532, 544 (Burton Weisbrod ed. 1978) (“A well-established theorem of welfare
economics holds that, as long as donors do not prefer in-kind to cash contributions, economic
efficiency favors cash contributions.”).
55. See Cramton, supra note 2, at 1127-28 (questioning the efficiency of having “an officer
lawyer specializing in corporate tax matters” undertake representation of the poor); Rhode,
Cultures of Commitment, supra note 34, at 2423 (“In opponents’ view, having corporate lawyers
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specialties of such lawyers, it is often said, seldom have any direct
usefulness to the poor.  To be sure, these specialists are doubtlessly
quick studies, and presumably could come up to speed on areas of
law more immediately relevant to indigents.56  But, so the argument
runs, why don’t these specialists simply stick with their day jobs, bill at
their regular rates, and set aside an amount equal to their routine
hourly rates times the number of hours they would otherwise have
worked pro bono?  They could then donate the earnings thus
earmarked to lawyers specially trained to handle the legal needs of
the poor, or to organizations that employ such lawyers.  Wouldn’t the
poor be better off ?57  It is hard to see why not.58
                                                                                                                                     
dabble in poverty cases will provide unduly expensive, often incompetent services.”); Shapiro,
supra note 9, at 781-82 (arguing in more general terms for the greater efficiency of exacting pro
bono service from lawyers as a “tax” rather than a “draft”); Silverman, supra note 1, at 917-25
(analyzing economic incentives for specialized, large firm lawyers to discharge pro bono
obligations through alternatives to their own direct provision of legal services to the poor).
56. See Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 812 (“Even in an age of pervasive
specialization, lawyers are known for their versatility as generalists, for their capacity to master
the unfamiliar complexities of cases in areas of the law in which they may have had little or no
prior training or exposure.”); Cramton, supra note 2, at 1127 (“An able lawyer can pick up these
skills given sufficient training and hard work.”).  I assume this for the sake of argument; not
everyone is willing to concede the point.  See Murray, supra note 11, at 1163 (citing concern that
many lawyers may not be competent to handle the legal needs of the poor).  For a creative
solution, see LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 277-82.  Luban proposes that lawyers
receive pro bono credit for studies that prepare them for doing the legal work of the poor.  But,
as I argue in the text following this note, that may not be the use of their time that most
benefits the poor.
57. This is a time-honored suggestion, traceable not only to giants of the bench and bar,
see, e.g., Murray, supra note 11, at 1142 (quoting Charles Evans Hughes, Symposium on Legal
Aid 1920) (“The lawyer in a great city best discharges his obligation to the poor, not by
attempting to deal with matters to which his experience is foreign, but by supporting the legal
aid association.”), but also to the principle progenitor of the modern legal aid movement.  See
Smith, JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 220-25.  And this suggestion continues to attract adherents.
See, e.g., Mary Coombs, Your Money of Your Life: A Modest Proposal for Mandatory Pro Bono Services, 3
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 215, 220 (1993) (“[T]he poor will benefit more under a plan with a buy-out
option than under a straight time obligation, because they will receive either work performed
by those who choose to do such work or an equal or larger quantity of services from public
interest lawyers funded through monetary contributions.”).  See also Marc Galanter & Thomas
Palay, Let Firms Buy and Sell Credit for Pro Bono, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at 17; Burke, Mandatory
Pro Bono, supra note 11, at 997 n.70 (citing other recent proponents); Wachtler, supra note 2, at
740 (“Mandatory pro bono is at best an inefficient way to deliver the very specialized kind of
legal services that poor people need.  The most common and critical problems faced by people
in need . . . require the aid of a lawyer who works on a day-to-day basis with the complex and
ever-changing maze of statutes and regulations that govern such matters.”); Cramton, supra
note 2, at 1128 (“Funds for the provision of training, backup, and support of thousands of
compelled lawyers might better be spent in hiring poverty law specialists to do the job.”);
Stephen Ellman, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 164 (1990)
(same); Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 839 (calling for greater public subsidies of
legal services lawyers “to deal more effectively and efficiently with the crushing volume of cases
requiring special knowledge in these public entitlement laws and procedures”).
58. You could, of course, assume a change in taste, the kind of second-order effects that
neo-classic economics discountenances.  Maybe, for example, the boutique lawyers would
donate more of their time to the poor in the future if they saw, first-hand, how needy the poor
really are or how rewarding working directly for the poor really is.  See Ellmann, supra note 57,
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And, in addition to being more economically efficient--delivering
more bang for the buck--this form of privately-funded legal service for
the poor has another advantage over traditional pro bono: It
separates the giver from the receiver.59  This helps break down the
relation of subservience that direct donor provision may engender, as
we have seen.  To be sure, a lawyer will still be providing the needed
service, but it is a lawyer who is being paid for the work.
This system of in-cash voluntary provision of legal services,
however, has two related disadvantages.  One disadvantage is
economic; the other, moral.  These disadvantages deserve close
analysis, moreover, because both of them beset every voluntary system
of providing legal services to the poor, whether in cash and indirectly,
as I prefer, or in kind and directly, as in the prevailing system.
The economic problem of voluntary provision, whether in cash or
in kind, is a special case of the free-rider problem.  Any public good
financed by voluntary private donations is likely to be
undersupplied.60  Rather than contribute, some of those who will
consume the good in question “free ride” on the contributions of
others.  Listener-sponsored public radio is a classic example;61 it’s easy
to tune in without paying up.  This is an entirely rational strategy for
any particular individual, since, by definition, enjoyment of public
goods cannot be restricted to those who pay for them.  At the
collective level, however, this strategy may well result in an
                                                                                                                                     
at 164 (citing this possible advantage of in kind payment). You could also tip the scales in favor
of the relative inefficiency of pro bono representation by throwing in the benefits to the lawyers
themselves from serving the poor directly.  But you’d have to be careful here.  Some moralists
of the highest rank consider that the most moral of actions are done from the purest sense of
duty, not from any desire for self-satisfaction.  See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE FOUNDATIONS
OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1969).  Thus the security lawyer who toils away extra hours at
the Wall Street job in order to donate the extra billings to the poor may be more virtuous than
the fellow who puts the time in at Legal Services, precisely because the former derives less
pleasure from his charitable work than the latter.
     Most opponents of buy-out provisions see it not as bad for the poor, but as unfair to the
conscripted lawyer.  See Joseph W. Bellacosa, Obligatory Pro Bono Publico Services, 19 FORDHAM L.
REV. 745, 749 (1991) (comparing pro bono buy-out provisions with Civil War paid military
substitutes); Statement by Thomas F. Gleason, 19 FORDHAM L. REV. 846, 846 (1991) (dissenting
from Marrero Committee Report on same ground); see also Marrero Committee Report, supra
note 5, at 802 (“Opponents of the [buy-out provision of the committee’s mandatory] plan
contended that from the public policy perspective this practice would appear no different from
the hiring of substitute conscripts by the wealthy to escape military duty.”).
59. See Council for Public Interest Law, supra note 52, at 21 (noting that the legal service
rendered by the proto-typical legal aid program, that offered immigrants by the German Aid
Society of New York in 1876, was not provided as a gift from individual lawyers to individual
poor clients thrown together by chance.  It was a social service under the third-party subsidy of
an independent organization.).
60. MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 122
(Anderson Pub. Co. 1996).
61. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 850-51 (1980).
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undersupply of the good in question, as each consumer hangs back
hoping others will pay.  Meeting the legal needs of the poor is an
obvious public good, from the perspective of all those who enjoy
living in a more just society.62  But--here is the free rider problem--that
increase in social justice is one that many will be tempted to enjoy
without making any contribution of their own.63
This free-rider problem may perhaps be partially overcome by
private contributions of money or services.  This occurs fairly often in
the case of other public goods; think, again, of the example of
listener-sponsored radio.64  But then the economic problem with
voluntary subsidies of legal services to the poor merely gives way to a
moral problem: Provision of public goods by voluntary contributions
amounts to a tax on the more generous of citizens.  A critical public
need is met, but only at the expense of the unusually virtuous, those
who pay (or work) when others hold back (or out).65
These last two problems--the free rider problem and the implicit
tax on willing donors--are, I suspect, what lead most leftists to enlist in
the cause of mandatory pro bono.66  In the next section, accordingly,
                                                          
62. See B. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 20-29 (1978) (citing as a positive externality of subsidized legal services improvement
in “the face of justice,” public satisfaction with the administration of justice); see also Cramton,
supra note 2, at 1125 (“[T]he widespread unavailability of legal assistance to poor persons
undermines ideals we all take seriously (e.g. equal justice under law, access to the legal system,
and the rule of law).”) (citing Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5); Marrero Committee
Report, supra note 5, at 774 (“This failure [to meet the legal needs of the poor] takes an
intolerable toll not only on the poor but [also] on the public as a whole.”); Shapiro, supra note
9, at 789 (“[T]here may be significant benefits to others accruing from [legal] representation
that would not be realized if we left all responsibility for such matters with the people directly
affected.”).
63. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 789-91 (analyzing likely undersupply of voluntary pro bono
legal services to the poor as a classic free rider problem); see also Smith, Mandatory Pro Bono
Standard, supra note 41, at 729 (“The majority of lawyers have used the fact that some lawyers
have provided legal assistance to the poor for free, or at a reduced fee, as an excuse not to
render any type of public service themselves.”).
64. See Hansmann, supra note 61, at 850-51.
65. See Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 758 (“To shift the burden to a small
force of volunteers is unrealistic and unfair and would condone the shirking of professional
duty by those who decline to contribute.”); id. at 776 (“Voluntary programs tend to spread the
burden of providing legal services unevenly and unfairly . . . .”); id. at 828-29 (“To shunt the
weight of this responsibility to a limited number of volunteers . . . is unconscionable in principle
and inherently unfair to those who do contribute.”).  Rather ironically, however, the Committee
Report heaps scorn on the proposition that voluntary pro bono programs might discourage
public funding for indigent legal services.  Id. at 831-32.
66. See Arcia, supra note 11, at 778 (“As voluntary pro bono programs nationwide have
failed to adequately address and remedy the increasing legal needs of the poor, so also has it
been the trend for the strongest proponents of pro bono service to become frustrated with the
ineffectiveness of these voluntary programs, and become ardent supporters of mandatory
schemes.”) (citations omitted); Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 827 (“In several
other jurisdictions in which courts, legal services and organized Bar groups obtained
consistently disappointing results from appeals for volunteers, they chose to support judicially-
imposed pro bono legal services programs in order to address the critical need.”).
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we need to examine the promises and limitations of this alternative.
B. Mandatory Pro Bono
Mandatory lawyer pro bono may go a long way toward overcoming
two problems of voluntary lawyer pro bono, the free rider problem
and the tax on willing donors.67  But mandatory pro bono leaves
other problems untouched,68 and creates some of its own.69  It leaves
the non-anonymous charity problem essentially untouched; both the
recipient and others know the provider.  It might be objected, of
course, that the provision itself is no longer charitable, and thus
potentially degrading to the recipient, once it is made mandatory.
But that is only true in general, not in particular.  As long as lawyers
may turn down any particular client, then, with respect to any such
client, the provision of service is a boon.70  If you are a poor person,
your pro bono lawyer is doing you a favor as long as he or she could
have chosen someone else to work for.
As we have seen, even voluntary pro bono representation can
sensibly be seen as a sort of substitute tax system.  The analogy of
mandatory pro bono to taxation is even more obvious, and more
                                                          
67. I say “may” because no such program has actually been tried on anything but a very
limited local level, and, without proper enforcement mechanisms, even the most carefully
crafted program would simply regress back to a de facto voluntary system.  See Lardent, supra
note 2, at 79-81 (discussing a few jurisdictions that prevented bar membership instead of
preventing practice altogether).
68. As a practical matter, no mandatory pro bono program offers any real hope of actually
coming anywhere close to meeting the legal needs of the poor.  See Burke, Mandatory Pro Bono,
supra note 11, at 1019 (basing this conclusion on economic models of various pro bono plans);
see also Arcia, supra note 11, at 797 (concluding that twenty hours of unpaid legal services by
every Florida lawyer would nevertheless leave the legal needs of the poor “drastically unmet”).
But see Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 784-85 (asserting that “the combined
contribution of legal services” produced by compliance of most of New York state’s 88,000
lawyers with a minimum twenty hours per year requirement “would be significant”); Silverman,
supra note 1, at 1024, 1030 (conceding that the Marrero Committee proposal for mandatory
pro bono in New York state “will fall far short of completely meeting the estimated extreme
need,” but concluding, on the basis of plausible approximations, that its effect “is difficult to
dismiss . . . as quantitatively insubstantial”).
69. One of these is the problem of a “hidden” tax.  See Cramton, supra note 2, at 1134
(“When the costs of a social program are buried in a less visible ‘professional obligation,’ issues
concerning alternative ways to provide low-cost legal services to the poor are also submerged.”).
70. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 947 (“[T]he lawyer taxpayer may directly control which
eligible client, organization or service group receives and retains the use of her tax
contribution.”).  This problem could be lessened, perhaps, by implementing mandatory pro
bono through a voucher system, which would allow pro bono clients to shop for their own
lawyers, as under judicare systems.  Id. at 1100, 1107.  Some academic proponents of mandatory
pro bono have proposed the use of vouchers, id. at 1099-1108; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 279-81, but their ideas have not been taken up in formal proposals.  And, even if
they were, elements of the problem would remain.  Unless lawyers were compelled to take any
voucher-bearing client, the ultimate choice would still lie with the lawyer.  And every client
paying with a voucher, and every lawyer so paid, would know that the service was “free.”
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problematic.71  The problem here is inadequate progressivity.
Progressive taxation, as its name implies, has been a part of the
progressive program since the days of Woodrow Wilson’s New
Freedom72 (if not Robin Hood’s Sherwood Forest).  Simply stated, it
involves taxing the relative well off at higher rates than the less well
off, then using the revenues for programs that benefit the latter--
taking from the rich to give to the poor, if you will.  We haven’t the
time here to address the moral and economic cases against
progressive taxation, though I’m convinced that both can be more
than adequately met.73  Deferring that debate for another day--most
likely with another audience--I want to show why mandatory pro bono
is almost certainly a regressive--or inadequately progressive--form of
tax.
On first face, mandatory pro bono seems to be progressive.  It does,
after all, compel lawyers to confer benefits on the indigent, and the
latter class is certainly less well off economically than the former.
Indeed, a system of mandatory pro bono can easily be designed to
ensure that no lawyer ever confers a benefit on any client who is
economically better off.  That, so far as it goes, would be perfectly
progressive.74
There are, however, three progressivity problems.  The first has to
do with the incidence of the tax, with, in non-technical terms, the
question of who will ultimately bear the burden.  The argument
outlined above assumes that the burden will fall on lawyers; that,
however, may well not be true, or at least not entirely true.75  Lawyers
                                                          
71. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 942 (“If a tax may be defined as a compulsory levy or
exaction, regularly imposed by government without conditioning taxpayer liability on any
specific benefit received, surely [the Marrero Committee’s mandatory pro bono] proposal
qualifies.”) (citation omitted); see also Cramton, supra note 2, at 1130 (“Whether a pro bono
obligation takes the form of an exaction of time, money, or leaves this choice to the individual
lawyer, it constitutes a special tax on lawyers.”); Ellman, supra note 57, at 167-68; John A.
Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An Overstated Objective, 65 A.B.A. J. 564, 566 (Apr. 1979);
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 783.
72. ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON: CAMPAIGNS FOR PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE 64-65 (1965).
73. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 1007 (“[I]t is arguable that real vertical equity requires
progressive taxation . . . .”) (citation omitted).  But cf. WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KELVEN, JR.,
THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953).  See generally JOHN F. DUE & ANN F.
FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 237 (7th ed. 1981)
(justifying progressive taxation on the diminishing marginal utility of money).
74. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 1006 (“While the burdens of a mandatory pro bono
program are hardly trivial in absolute dollar terms, it is also difficult to resist the judgment that
many in the profession will be able to bear the burden without a significant adverse impact
upon their professional or living standards.”).
75. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 783; Silverman, supra note 1, at 944 (“Perhaps the most
bedeviling uncertainty relates to the very complex phenomenon of tax shifting regularly
involves very high, if not impossible, information costs.”); see also Ellman, supra note 57, at 165-
66 (analyzing possibility of lawyers’ passing the burden of mandatory pro bono through to
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may well be able to pass the real cost of providing “free” legal services
to the poor along to their other, paying clients, in the form of higher
fees.  To the extent that this shifting occurs, 76 mandatory pro bono,
for all its superficial appearance as an in-kind tax on lawyers, becomes
a kind of hidden excise tax on the consumers of legal services.77  The
general justification of such a tax is deeply dubious.  Consumers of
legal services neither benefit directly from the tax nor uniquely
increase the social problem that the proceeds of the tax are used to
remedy.78  Nor is there is any reason to think them more able to pay
than the class of taxpayers as a whole, or that subset of all citizens
with relatively high incomes.  Thus the progressivity of such a tax is at
best difficult to assess, and quite possibly negative.79
Even if the burden of pro bono representation as an in-kind tax
were borne by lawyers, such a tax would still pose real problems of
progressivity.  In the first place, within the class of lawyers, the lower
echelons of lawyers may well already be doing the bulk of
uncompensated service to the poor.80  A requirement that each lawyer
work a set number of hours may in fact enhance progressivity, as
upper echelon lawyers typically bill at higher hourly rates.  But this
potential progressivity can be, and often is, undermined by provisions
that let elite lawyers “buy out” at flat rates or substitute the hours of
lower-rate, junior lawyers within their firms.81  Moreover, to the extent
                                                                                                                                     
paying clients and concluding that their success is “not clear”).
76. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 783  (explaining that the extent to which the tax can be
passed on consumers typically depends on the elasticity of demand for the good or service
taxed).
77. See id. at 943.
78. See id. at 943.
79. See id. at 944 (“It will be very difficult to conclusively characterize the Marrero
Committee’s tax proposal as either regressive or progressive as long as serious tax incidence
questions persist.”) (citation omitted).
80. See Cramton, supra note 2, at 1129 (criticizing Marrero Committee mandatory pro
bono proposal on the ground that “[m]any lawyers in sole or small firm practice currently
provide reduced fee service to the near poor or the working poor”); Murray, supra note 11, at
1146 n.29 (“Small firm attorneys argue that ‘the ‘little people’ (small-firm attorneys and sole
practitioners) already ‘donate’ many more that fifty hours per year in actual service to the
indigent and near indigent’ as they ‘routinely collect less than half of [their] agreed-upon
fees.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Letter to the Editor, Pro Bono Plan Doesn’t Understand Small-
Firm Practice, TEX. L. REV., Sept. 3, 1990, at 2).  But see Smith, Mandatory Pro Bono Standard, supra
note 41, at 732 (arguing that even lawyers who work full-time in legal aid or government offices
“still have an obligation to provide free legal services outside the scope of their employment”).
81. See Cramton, supra note 2, at 1133 (“[M]andatory pro bono proposals tend to be
regressive and inequitable, imposing a heavy burden on economically marginal lawyers and
harried associates, while treating more gently those at the senior ranks of large law firms.”);
Arcia, supra note 11, at 785; Steven Weshler, Attorneys’ Attitudes Toward Mandatory Pro Bono, 41
SYRACUSE L. REV. 909, 952-53 (1990); Humbach, supra note 71 at 566; see also Macey, supra note
11, at 1120-21 (criticizing certain features of the proposed New York mandatory pro bono plan
as regressively favoring law firms over small firms and solo practitioners); Silverman, supra note
ATKINSON.FINAL 3/7/01  9:02 PM
2001] THE GOOD AS THE ENEMY OF THE BEST 149
that solo practitioners and small firm lawyers are drawn
disproportionately from the ranks of minorities and women, as there
is at least some reason to believe they are,82 then this regressivity may
well compound other significant inequities.
In the second place, even a program that was progressive within
the class of lawyers might well not be progressive in comparison with
the funding of indigent legal services out of general revenues.  This
becomes apparent as soon as we consider those whom mandatory pro
bono programs inevitably exclude from the class of benefit providers--
from, in tax terms, the tax base.  Since mandatory pro bono systems
are effectively in-kind taxes on lawyers alone, they automatically
exclude everyone who is not a lawyer.  Now lawyers, as we have just
seen, are, both as a class and as individuals, better off than the
recipients of their pro bono services.  But there is no reason to think
that lawyers are the best off of all citizens, either individually or
collectively.  Indeed, it seems much more reasonable to assume
otherwise.  Proponents of progressive taxation should want a system
that taxes non-lawyers also--indeed, a system that taxes them more,
precisely to the extent that they are more wealthy.  Accordingly, why
should the mechanism for delivering legal services to the poor be
funded, in effect, by a tax on lawyers alone?83
A phrase from the famous (and recently re-affirmed) Miranda84
litany should remind us that it isn’t: “If you can’t afford a lawyer, one
will be provided for you by the public.”85  In the criminal context, as
                                                                                                                                     
1, at 1075-76 (noting that Marrero Committee, which proposed mandatory pro bono for New
York State, may have under-represented the smaller-firm practitioners, particularly from
suburban and upstate areas); id. at 998 (providing an analysis of mandatory pro bono as an
excise tax “supports the charge that the Marrero Committee’s mandatory pro bono proposal
discriminates against solo and smaller-firm practitioners.”); id. at 1005 (“[T]he ability of
numerous solo and small-firm practitioners to bear the burden of a mandatory pro bono tax is
clearly much less than that of larger-firm lawyers uniquely situated in the extraordinary
professional environment of New York City.”).  But cf. Smith, Mandatory Pro Bono Standard, supra
note 41, at 736 (“[T]he bar should encourage large firm lawyers to allow some members to
pursue primarily or even exclusively major pro bono projects while the other lawyers in the firm
perform their regular work.”).
82. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 1078 (“[A] growing number of solo practitioners may be
minority group members or women practicing part-time because of heavy family
responsibilities.”).
83. I am hardly the first either to raise this question, in these terms, or to give a negative
answer.  See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 783-84; Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 766
(citing “general agreement that society as a whole has paramount responsibility for solving the
problem and that it should respond by augmenting public funds for legal service providers”);
Id. at 770-71 (“We therefore recommend increased public spending for legal services to the
poor.”).
84. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), aff’d, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct.
2326 (2000) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to criminal defendants).
85. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) or, if you prefer, watch Gideon’s
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everyone who watches television knows, indigent defendants are
guaranteed legal representation.  And that guarantee, as all lawyers
know, rests upon the Constitution.
As every student of Constitutional law--and Poverty Law--knows, the
guarantee of a publicly-paid lawyer extends to very few non-criminal
matters.86  But that is no reason why other legal services to the poor
could not be funded in the same way.  In fact, of course, some are,
and have been for decades.  That is precisely what the federal Legal
Services Corporation and its local affiliates and analogues do: provide
lawyers to indigents in civil matters at the general taxpayers’ expense.
(And, as we have seen, that is the rule in most of Western Europe
today.)  But virtually no one believes that this publicly funded system,
as currently funded, is anywhere near sufficient to meet all the
legitimate legal needs of the poor.  Why not expand it?
Here, of course, we meet hard political reality, and here, I shall
argue, the response of liberalism’s left has been very shallow moral
and economic theory.  Liberals of the left believe we should expand
public provision of legal services to the poor (even liberals of the
center believe we should not contract it).  But opponents have had
the upper hand, and the cause of expansion has been a rear-guard
action, not a vanguard, since the end of Johnson’s Great Society.87
                                                                                                                                     
Trumpet (Worldvision Enterprises, Inc. 1985).
86. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding Federal due
process does not require state to provide counsel for indigent parent in child custody case); see
also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (providing right to counsel to confined juveniles);
Argersinger  v. Hamilin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending right to counsel in misdemeanor cases
which can result in imprisonment).  My long-time patron and present boss, Sandy D’Alemberte,
has petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to adopt a rule recognizing the inherent power of
Florida Courts to appoint unpaid counsel in civil cases, based largely on a statute to that effect
enacted by the English Parliament in 1495, during the reign of Henry VII.  Presumably, Justice
Holmes’s argument against the inherent wisdom of ancient rules, invoking as it does the era of
an even more remote King Henry, applies a fortiori: “It is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
imitation of the past.”  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).  What is more, the precedent of English practice as to appointment of unpaid counsel
seems especially weak.  See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 740-49 (examining English precedents,
including the statute of 1495, and concluding that “the case for compulsory, gratuitous service
by American lawyers--in particular cases or on a broader scale--cannot be based in substantial
part on English tradition.”); see also id. at 753 (“To justify coerced, uncompensated legal services
on the basis of a firm tradition in England and the United States is to read into that tradition a
story that is not there.”).  See e.g., Mallard v. District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1989) (relying
in part on Shapiro’s study to reject an interpretation of a federal statute that would have
permitted courts to compel lawyers to provide uncompensated services for indigent civil
clients).
87. See Talbot D’Alemberte, The Role of the Courts in Providing Legal Services: A Proposal To
Provide Legal Access for the Poor, 17 FLA. ST. U. L.  REV. 107, 109 (1989) (“I have watched with
dismay as federal funds for legal services have been held to an obviously inadequate level . . . .”);
Wachtler, supra note 2, at 741 (noting that “although greater public funding may be a more
efficient and more equitable answer, it is simply unrealistic to believe it will be forthcoming in
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Faced with that politically reality, proponents of expanded legal
services to the poor made a fateful choice.  They essentially
abandoned the high ground of publicly funded legal services and
turned to a much less ambitious alternative: mandatory pro bono.88
We have already seen why, of these two means, mandatory pro bono
is the second best.  What remains to be seen, in the next section, is
how its advocates have played into the hands of opponents of the
best.
III.  THE GOOD AS THE ENEMY OF THE BEST
The key here is a mistake of moral and economic theory that is also
a major blunder of political tactics.  Proponents of mandatory pro
bono have offered justifications that are not only dubious on their
own merits, but also extremely useful to the opponents of publicly-
subsidized legal services for the poor.  Nor is that the worst of the
campaign for the second best.  Many of its proponents, having
despaired of publicly subsidized legal services and failed at imposing
mandatory lawyer pro bono in its stead, have urged--with sad success--
throwing law students into the breach.  Faced with a series of
disappointing harvests, they are suggesting we eat the seed-corn.
                                                                                                                                     
the near future,” especially since “the trend in the last decade has been to the contrary.”).  For
an astute analysis of why elected officials have been, and will likely continue to be, leery of
increasing public expenditures for legal services to the poor, see Silverman, supra note 1, at 971-
84.
88. See Lardent, supra note 2, at 101 (“The emphasis on mandatory pro bono . . .
constitutes a troubling retreat from the central proposition that addressing that issue [legal aid
to the poor] is primarily a matter of public, not professional obligation . . . .”).  New York’s
Marrero Committee was particularly pointed, and poignant, in making this choice.  See Marrero
Committee Report, supra note 5, at 779-80 (“If the Committee were satisfied that higher public
appropriations commensurate with the demand were a realistic prospect in the immediate
future, it might reach a different conclusion. . . .”); id. at 781 (“While the Committee concurs
that solutions of the unmet civil legal services crisis is indeed a societal obligation, our point of
departure regarding the responsibility issue relates to the question of whether, absent any
foreseeable, adequate societal response, lawyers should be obligated to contribute reasonable
services and resources to relieve the problem.”); see also Ellman, supra note 57, at 167 n.12 (“If
no other politically feasible plan for supplying legal services to the poor is now on the horizon,
then I believe the tax inefficiencies of mandatory pro bono would be worth accepting.”);
Alexander Forger, Mandatory Pro Bono: Yes, 74 A.B.A J. 46 (May 1, 1998) (agreeing “that justice
is the responsibility of all of society, and that it ought to be prepared to fund the Legal Services
Corporation,” but insisting that “until that occurs, I don’t think lawyers can afford to sit on the
sidelines.”); Lardent, supra note, 2 at 88-92, 95 (tracing the support for mandatory pro bono to
disappointment with voluntary pro bono programs that were themselves responses to Reagan-
era budget cuts); Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 34, at 2424 (conceding that “hiring
additional poverty law specialists would be a more efficient way of increasing services than
relying on reluctant dilettantes,” but concluding that “[u]nfortunately, the funding increase
that would be necessary to meet existing demand does not appear plausible in this political
climate”).
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A. The Bad Arguments for the Second Best
The first dubious justification for mandatory pro bono rests on the
premise that lawyers extract inappropriate benefits from society; the
second assumes they inflict inappropriate harms.  In the first theory,
mandatory pro bono re-captures some of the ill-gotten gains; in the
second, it provides compensation or deterrence for the wrongs.  But
in both cases, either there is no such crime or the punishment does
not fit it.
1. Lawyers as Monopolists: Making a Travesty of Trust-Busting
Here, disassembled into its component parts, is the principal
petard with which defenders of mandatory lawyer pro bono are
hoisting the left-liberal case for expanded public assistance:89
Major premise: Lawyers have a monopoly on the provision of legal
services.90
Minor premise: This lawyer monopoly prices many poor people out
of the market.
Conclusion: Lawyers themselves should meet the legal needs of the
poor.
In other words, meeting the legal needs of the poor is a moral
obligation of lawyers as a class, since it is lawyers’ monopoly on the
delivery of legal services that prices the poor out of the market for
legal services.
This petard--canard, really, as we shall soon see--has an
appropriately peculiar provenance.  The notion that law and other
professions operate as exploitative monopolies, long the darling of
economic theory’s far right,91 has lately become the pet hypothesis of
                                                          
89. For various versions of this argument, and rebuttals, see Macey, supra note 11, at 1121-
22 (arguing that lawyers cannot now charge monopoly rents owing to competition from new
entrants); Millemann, supra note 8, at 72-75 (presenting a version of the monopoly
justification); Murray, supra note 11, at 1150-51; Rhode, supra note 34, at 2419 (summarizing
argument); Wachtler, supra note 2, at 740 (summarizing lawyer monopoly argument and
parallel argument about other licensed occupations); see also Cramton, supra note 2, at 1126,
1134-36 (stating and rejecting monopoly rationale); Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5,
at 783 (“[B]oth the lawyers’ greater public obligations and their related privileges give rise to
the public’s right to place reasonably greater burdens on lawyers than on other citizens to
improve our legal system.”); id. at 780 (recounting lawyers’ special duty, beyond that of ordinary
citizens, “arises principally from the lawyer’s possession of unique training and skills and of the
exclusive, publicly granted franchise to practice law.”); Silverman, supra note 1, at 1018-19
(“Lawyers have a certain collective responsibility . . . for the high costs of access to our formal
system of justice.”); see also Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-
Income Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1999) [hereinafter Fordham Conference
Recommendations] (“Access to justice is the responsibility of every lawyer.”).
90. Cf. Cramton, supra note 2, at 1136 (“[I]t is no longer accurate to speak of a
professional monopoly.”).
91. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
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sociology’s far left.92  But its tersest statement came from socialism’s
literary left, in George Bernard Shaw’s dictum that “All professions
are conspiracies against the laity.”93
The traditional view of both sociology and economics was just the
reverse.  Both functionalist sociologists and welfare economists have
seen professions as means of ensuring that difficult-to-evaluate
services get delivered to consumers at reasonable prices.  The truth,
as most scholars are coming to admit, doubtlessly lies somewhere in
the middle, between traditional functionalist theorists on the one
hand and revisionist dominance theorists on the other.94  Some
aspects of professional regulation are clearly monopolistic; others,
equally clearly pro-consumer;95 still others, like high standards of legal
education, may be pro-consumer in the net and the long run, though
not without identifiable costs to some in the short run.96
Recognizing this complex truth about the bar’s putative monopoly
on legal services is particularly important in the context of providing
legal services to the poor, for two reasons.  The first has to do with
those aspects of professional regulation that are anti-competitive; the
second, with those that are legitimately pro-consumer.  Ideally, the
former should be identified and simply eliminated.97  This would
predictably lower the cost of legal services, enabling more of the poor
or nearly poor to afford lawyers.  A perfect example, long advocated
by liberals of both the left and the right, would be licensing para-
professions to perform a wide range of relatively straightforward legal
jobs that have been unnecessarily limited to lawyers.98
                                                          
92. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism, in 1
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD (R. Abel & P. Lewis eds. 1989); MAGALI
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977).
93. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S DILEMMA, act I (Brenatno’s ed., 1923) (1911).
94. See Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary, supra note 14 (summarizing trends in academic
treatments of professionalism from positive to negative and back to a more balanced middle).
95. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 787 (“Some of these ethical standards may exist because
the imperfections of the market make it impossible to rely solely on free competition among
suppliers.  Other standards may reinforce those imperfections.  And still others may be rooted
in concerns transcending the functioning of the market.”) (citations omitted).
96. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 1019 (citing legal education as example of the organized
bar’s “long and controversial history of promoting high-cost justice systems, sometimes
seemingly for the best of reasons”).  Cf. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 108-09 (1976) (noting anti-competitive motives that often
accompanied efforts to raise standards of legal education).
97. See Silverman, supra note 1 at 945 (“The classic concern, of course, is that an
unregulated monopoly will restrict output or curtail service to maximize prices.”) (citation
omitted).
98. See Burke, Mandatory Pro Bono Standard, supra note 11, at 989 (“A preferred alternative
to attorney involvement in these problems might be paraprofessional specialist involvement.”);
see also Cramton, supra note 2, at 1137 (recommending, in a range of preferable alternatives to
mandatory pro bono, that “the bar should seek to further the competitive marketplace in the
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The second reason, concerning legitimate professional regulation,
is even more critical.  To the extent that a particular restriction on
the delivery of legal services operates in favor of consumers, it makes
no sense to see lawyers themselves as its principal beneficiaries.  If the
public is the real and intended beneficiary of such measures, then
their incidental cost--pricing the poor out of the private market for
such services--is properly laid at the feet of the public, not the bar.
Accordingly, it is the public, not the bar, that should properly finance
legal services to the poor.99
Steven Lubet and Catheryn Stewart have offered a variation on the
lawyer monopoly justification of lawyers’ pro bono obligations that
tries to take account of this latter point.100  They concede that many of
the price-increasing aspects of the regulation of the delivery of legal
services, in particular the ethical and evidentiary rules designed to
protect confidentiality, are pro-client rather than anti-competitive.
They argue, however, that lawyers themselves nonetheless reap the
benefits of such rules, principally in the form of higher fees.  Since
these rules are, in effect, “public assets,” some of the unearned
“rents” lawyers derive from them may appropriately be “recaptured”
in cash or in kind through mandatory pro bono programs.
This is a subtle but ultimately unsatisfactory refinement, for two
reasons.  First, Lubet and Stewart confuse monopoly rents with price
increases attributable to consumer-friendly regulations and other real
costs.  They argue, for example, that lawyers, protected as they are by
more aggressive confidentiality rules, are at a competitive advantage
over against alternative providers, particularly accountants, of
                                                                                                                                     
delivery of routine legal services by abandoning some restrictive practices that reduce the
availability and increase the cost of routine legal service.”); Green, supra note 2, at 1727 (“[I]t
has become increasingly plain that, with training, individuals who are not licensed to practice
law may competently assist low-income persons in dealing with legal problems that are not
being addressed by lawyers.”); Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2241 (1999) (“Nonlawyer legal assistance is a necessary ingredient of
any plan for meaningful access to the courts.”); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services
by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 213 (1990) (noting that “do-it-yourself” kits are
available for lay persons representing themselves); Shapiro, supra note 9, at 791 (arguing that
preservation of a putative lawyer monopoly cannot justify mandatory pro bono, because
elimination of any such monopoly would be socially beneficial); see also LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 269-72 (calling for the deregulation of routine legal services).  But see
Smith, Mandatory Pro Bono Standard, supra note 41, at 735 (“If the profession does not provide
the needed service, the public will have no choice but to permit encroachment by
nonlawyers.”).
99. See Lubet & Stewart, supra note 26, at 1248 (“While the need for broader legal services
is relatively easy to demonstrate, it has not been rigorously established that individual lawyers
should bear the burden of meeting that need.”).
100. See id.; see also Silverman, supra note 1, at 945-46 (comparing mandatory pro bono
proposals to classic public utility regulation in general and to obligation of public utilities to
provide free or below-cost service in particular).
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otherwise fungible services.  Without the greater confidentiality that
lawyers can offer under publicly created rules, clients might purchase
tax advice from accountants at lower rates.  Since they cannot--so the
argument runs--lawyers are able to pocket the difference between
their rates and the lower rates of accountants as additional profits.
But this argument assumes that there are no legitimate, pro-
competitive reasons for protecting information in lawyers’ hands
more than in accountants’ hands.  If there are not, then the
appropriate response would be to extend the fuller protection to
accountants and perhaps others, or to deny it to all; this is but a
special case of the elimination of lawyer cartelling, which I advocated
above.  On the other hand, if there are pro-competitive reasons for
giving lawyers special advantages, then it is unlikely that lawyers will
be able to collect monopoly rents on their more valuable services.
Rather, competition among lawyers should eliminate any such
rents.101  To be sure, the services of lawyers, enhanced by the greater
protection the law affords client secrets in their hands, may well cost
more than analogous services from other providers.  But this will be
attributable to the real costs of training lawyers or protecting secrets,
not to any anti-competitive extraction of monopoly rents by lawyers.102
The second problem with the Lubet-Stewart “public assets” theory
is that it proves too much.  As they rightly argue, the secrets that the
law protects in the hands of lawyers are a species of property that
could not exist without legal protection.  But this is true of all
property; as Bentham rightly perceived, “Property and law are born
together, and die together.  Before laws were made there was no
property; take away laws, and property ceases.”103  David Luban,
explicitly generalizing from Lubet and Stewart’s point,104 suggests
otherwise: “In principle, pharmaceuticals and food could be
produced and marketed without with intervention or even existence
of the state, which confines its role to regulating and policing
                                                          
101. See Ellman, supra note 57, at 168 (“[A]lthough it is true that the bar has a monopoly on
the right to perform legal services, individual lawyers do not exercise monopolistic power.”)
(citation omitted).
102. Typical of Lubet and Stewart’s confusion is their lumping real costs like legal education
together with likely anti-competitive practices like state-by-state bar exams and admissions as
“barriers to entry.”  Lubet & Stewart, supra note 26, at 1259.  In technical economic parlance,
barriers to entry refer only to artificial, cartel-imposed restrictions, not real costs.
103. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (2d ed. 1950); see also Ellman, supra
note 57, at 168 (rejecting distinction between lawyers and grocers on the grounds that both
occupations in their present form are “very much a matter within the actual or potential control
of the modern state”).
104. David Luban faults Lubet and Stewart for failing to see how much lawyers benefit from
all law, not just the specific aspects they rely on.  Luban, Faculty Pro Bono, supra note 39, at 64
n.12.  But he himself, in turn, fails to see that the same point applies to all other citizens as well.
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markets.”105  “In principle,” perhaps.  But when drug-abusers
burglarized my father’s veterinary hospital when I was a boy, I
became a practical, if limited-purpose, Benthamite.  And, short of
Utopia, even libertarians prefer states to anarchy, if only to protect
their property.106
It is precisely this inevitably state-backed, social basis of property
that justifies taxation to meet social needs.  It is doubtlessly
appropriate to tax lawyers to provide for such needs, on account of
the benefits they themselves reap from living in a civil society.  But
there is no reason to limit what these taxes buy to legal services for
the poor.  On the other hand, and much more to the present point,
there is no reason to tax lawyers any more or less than others who
share that very general benefit.107  The only real question is who to
tax, and how much.  This, of course, only takes us back to where we
began: the social democratic preference for progressive taxation.  If
we could prove in the case of lawyers how much they benefit from
particular socially-created “property,” then it might well be
appropriate to tax them on that basis.  That, in effect, is what user
fees are for.  But we lack the critical data to charge lawyers’ user fees
for the “public assets” Lubet and Stewart purport to have identified.
Even Lubet and Stewart concede that they have “not been able to
locate the appropriate number of pro bono hours”; though they
“posit that it probably lies between 20 and 50 hours per year,” they
leave that range as a pure, unproved postulation.108
By arguing otherwise, in order to persuade the bar to favor a
second best measure, mandatory pro bono, proponents of that
measure give opponents of publicly funded legal services a valuable
argument.  If the shortfall in legal services to the poor is the fault of
lawyers, then it would hardly be fair to impose that burden on the
innocent public.  Thus, in arguing a dubious moral case for their
second-best measure, proponents of mandatory pro bono play into
the hands of the opponents of the best and fairest solution to a
                                                          
105. Luban, Faculty Pro Bono, supra note 39, at 63.
106. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
107. David Luban is thus entirely right to insist that law professors have obligations precisely
parallel to those lawyers who provide legal services to the poor.  Luban, Faculty Pro Bono, supra
note 39, at 68.  And he is quite right to insist, further, that our obligation is greater than that of
impecunious humanities professors.  Id. at 67.  But I think he is wrong not to think that the
same principle of social obligation applies to everyone, and is measured better by their income
or net economic worth than by their proximity to the practice of law.
108. Lubet & Stewart, supra note 26, at 1307.  Lubet and Stewart concede there are flaws in
their analogies to other public assets but their analogies are informative in that they illustrate
the uniqueness of the relationship between public assets and the practice of law.
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general social problem.109
2. Lawyers as Polluters: Imposing a Pseudo-Pigouvan Tax
Lubet and Stewart purport to find the justification for a special tax
on lawyers in special benefits lawyers derive from the law.  David
Luban takes the converse approach, finding his justification in the
harms lawyers inflict through the law.110  Against the argument that
mandatory pro bono is a “conscription tax” on the role of lawyers,
Luban recommends it as a way “to guard against third-party harms
created [by] the business-as-usual work of that role--‘externalities,’ an
economist would call them--inflicted upon the unrepresented.”111
This externality argument, like the monopoly argument (which
Luban also deploys), is designed to explain why lawyers have a special
obligation, over and above that of the citizenry in general, to meet
the legal needs of the poor.  The reason, so the argument runs, is
that harm to others, in particular the poor, is a necessary by-product
of the lawyer’s role in an adversarial system of justice.  Luban’s
reference to externalities suggests that he has in mind a kind of
effluent tax or enterprise liability, at least by analogy.
There is, as the bulk of Luban’s book shows in persuasive detail, a
dangerous model of lawyering--the standard conception, as he calls it
there,112 or neutral partisanship, as he calls it elsewhere.113  That
model calls for lawyers to concern themselves solely with client gains
and to ignore, as far as the law will allow, harms to third parties and
to the public at large.  And, as he suggests with particular reference
to unrepresented poor people in housing court, doubtlessly the
                                                          
109. But see Wachtler, supra note 2, at 743 (“It will certainly be more difficult to generate
public support for such measures [as increased public funding for legal service organizations] if
attorneys do not consider the problem significant enough to make sacrifices of their own.”).
110. Luban has his own version of the monopoly theory, which he couches in essentially
social contract terms.  Lubet & Stewart, supra note 26, at 1262-84; Luban, Faculty Pro Bono, supra
note 39, at 63-70.  The complementarity of these benefit-reaped and harm-wrought theories is
not, as Luban points out, accidental: “These two sources . . . correspond to the social contract
principle and the no-harm principle that most soft-line libertarians accept.”  LUBAN, LAWYERS &
JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 287.  Interestingly, however, Luban emphasizes the benefit-reaped, not
the harms-wrought, justification in his most recent defense of pro bono.  Luban, Faculty Pro
Bono, supra note 39, at 63-70.
111. Lubet & Stewart, supra note 26, at 1287; see also Silverman, supra note 1, at 1022 (“Such
a problem of negative externalities, as the economists call it, is a classic justification for both
certain forms of public regulation and some longstanding excise taxes.”).
112. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 4, at xix-xx.
113. DEBORAH RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 135-36 (2d ed. 1995).  I prefer this
latter term because, as I have said elsewhere, it tends “to emphasize the two key elements of this
model and the fact that this model is not the only option available to lawyers in our culture.”
Rob Atkinson, Neutral Partisan Lawyering and International Human Rights Violators, 17 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 531, 531 n.1 (1994).
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doings of some of these lawyers directly do-in the poor.  I have long
since joined ranks with Luban and a host of others, in and out of
academia, in condemning such lawyering, particularly with respect to
innocent and indigent victims.  Legal though it may be, “tricking the
good in a bad cause is bad”--you can quote me on that.114
I have also argued--again, in the good company of many others--
that this form of lawyering is notoriously difficult to correct either by
classic, command-and-control legal regulations or by traditional tort
remedies.115  Here, one might reasonably think, attention to other
fields of regulation might provide useful cross-pollination.  In
particular, the law of lawyering might borrow from environmental law
the notion that the level of noxious by-products can be reduced to a
more nearly optimal level by burdening those by-products with a tax
designed to bring their otherwise “external” costs or harms home to
roost with their producers.  Similarly, we might borrow from tort law
the concept of strict product liability, the notion that those who
benefit from the sale of products that produce foreseeable harms
should compensate those who suffer from those harms.
But, whatever the validity of these approaches in their proper
fields, they hardly seem a plausible basis for a mandatory pro bono
requirement on the part of all lawyers.  Most obviously, the burden of
the mandatory pro bono system is not designed to rest on those who
directly harm the poor--those whose hired-gun, no-holds-barred
practice produces the analogue of noxious effluents or accidental
injuries.  Instead, Luban, like other proponents of mandatory pro
bono, explicitly anticipates that virtually all lawyers would have to
shoulder equal parts of the pro bono burden, irrespective of how
scrupulously they practice, or for whom.
But why burden the innocent along with the guilty, the virtuous
lawyers along with the vicious?116  It is as if organic farmers were taxed
                                                          
114. Rob Atkinson, Br’er Rabbit Professionalism: A Homily On Moral Heroes and Lawyerly Mores,
27 F.S.U. L. REV. 137, 141 (1999).
115. Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary, supra note 14, at 280-302; Ellman, supra note 57, at
146.  Cf. David Wasserman, Should a Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing?  David Luban on the Morality
of Adversary Representation, 49 MD. L. REV. 392, 422 n.152 (1990) (“[I]t seems odd to demand
redress for an injury while not requiring the lawyer to avoid it in the first place, by assuming a
less adversarial role.”).
116. See Ellman, supra note 57, at 169 (“It is not clear why lawyers whom we want to inflict
externalities [that tend to promote justice] should be liable for those externalities at all, nor
why lawyers who inflict varying degrees of externalities should be subject to the same measure
of redress.”); Silverman, supra note 1, at 1022 (“While it is clear that not all working lawyers are
equally involved in professional work that adversely affects the welfare of lower-income persons
and populations, any mandatory pro bono program that tried to differentiate lawyers, based on
the actual degree of low-income injury caused, would be hopelessly expensive if not impossible
to administer.”).
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on the production of vegetables to reduce the use of harmful
pesticides, or solar-powered electrical producers were assessed the
same per-kilowat sulfur dioxide effluent fee as coal-powered plants.
The absurdity in each case is obvious: If you want to discourage the
bad, you don’t impose the same penalty on the good.  Mandatory pro
bono is not absurd, but neither is it analogous to an effluent tax or
strict product liability.  It is not a tax or liability system designed to
curb anti-social conduct; it is a tax (or draft) designed to conscript
social resources.
In anticipating this response, Luban and his allies allege a form of
lawyer-generated harm that is far too generalized to make their case.
The problem, they insist, is not merely with individual lawyers
practicing by an ethically contemptible model on behalf of morally
dubious clients.  The problem, rather, is that our legal profession--
indeed, our system of justice--is adversarial.  And, if some “office”
lawyers are outside the court system altogether, they nevertheless “set
up a network of social practices from which the poor are, willy-nilly,
excluded.” 117
If this generalization were true, it would prove entirely too much.
Read for all it’s worth, it comes close to a tout court condemnation of
law, or capitalism, or both; as such, it risks lapsing out of liberalism
altogether, either leftward into socialism or rightward into the more
anarchistic reaches of libertarianism.  Read more strictly, it simply
makes an obvious, but here very damaging, point: Our system of
legally regulated market capitalism, for all its manifest virtues, has
undeniable short-comings.  The most salient, for present purposes, is
this: Without careful attention to the distribution of its bounties, the
rich tend to get richer and the poor, poorer.  Indeed, unless the poor
have lawyers, the rich will get the poor themselves, or at least all of
theirs that’s worth having.  But that, again, is a problem of mature
market economies, not of lawyers as a class, irrespective of how
conscientiously they practice law.
From the liberal perspective, it is not the case, as Luban concedes
to those on the far left and the far right, that “the community has
shaped the lawyer’s retail product with her in mind; it has made the
law to make the lawyer indispensable.”118 The most we can fairly say
                                                          
117. See  LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 287; see also Silverman, supra note 1,
at 1020-22 (detailing hypothetical cases of how individual lawyers directly and indirectly harm
the poor).
118. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 286.  Luban repeats this claim, in these
words, in Luban, Faculty Pro Bono, supra note 39, at 65.  But see Ellman, supra note 57, at 168-69
(“The claim [in Lawyers and Justice] that the law has been shaped to fit the interests of lawyers
. . . is over-stated.”).
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along these lines is this: The West’s complex economy and advanced
democracy require a legal regime of rules and rights that, in turn,
make lawyers indispensable.
Luban himself elsewhere admits as much: “I am skeptical about
how simple the law could be made in a society as enormously
complex as ours.”119  But that simply takes us back to the point Luban
would like to get beyond: The poor’s lack of lawyers is a generalized
social problem; as such, it calls for a general, social solution, not a tax
on lawyers.120  In a society like ours, poor people, right along with the
rest of us, are very much in the dark without illumination from
lawyers.  It’s a sad day for the liberal left when the general public
curses the candlemakers, but a sadder day when scholars propose to
tax them on their product.
This approach has another corrosive effect as well.  Lawyers
themselves may experience Luban’s pseudo-Pigouvan pollution tax,
not as a penalty, but as a form of penance.  Doing pro bono work may
neither effectively deter nor fully offset the kind of purely private-
interested lawyering that Luban effectively criticizes in the first part of
his book.  Ironically, something close to the reverse may occur.  They
may see pro bono work as penance that fully absolves them of
responsibility for the publicly harmful aspects of their dubious model
of private practice.
This, indeed, seems to be precisely what happened at the dawn of
the heyday of neutral partisan lawyering.  In the era of the robber
barons, many elite lawyers experienced what legal historian Robert
Gordon described as “institutionalized schizophrenia: the position
that lawyers should take some time off from private practice to
engage in public service, but that the two roles were antagonistic: so
that it was appropriate for lawyers in one role to do the utmost to
undo their accomplishments in the other.”121  It was against precisely
this kind of unstable compromise, both socially and personally
destructive, that Brandeis proposed his integration of public values
and private practice, the very model Luban himself adopts and
elaborates.122
                                                          
119. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 244-45 n.20.
120. See Wasserman, supra note 115, at 422 n.152 (“While the harm of adversary
representation may require subsidies for the injured class, it does not require that those
subsidies come out of lawyers’ pockets.”).
121. Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of New York
City Lawyers, 1870-1970, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (G.
Gawalt, ed., ) (1984).
122. See generally LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 288.
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3. Conclusion
In the final analysis, with respect to both these allegedly left-liberal
arguments for a special lawyerly obligation to serve the poor, I cannot
help but share the view of former California Supreme Court Justice
Rose Bird (no slouch of a left-liberal herself!): “As with any other
working person, lawyers should be properly compensated for their
time and effort . . . .  ‘Lawyers in our society are entitled to no greater
privileges than the butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker; but
they are certainly entitled to no less.’”123  And, it is worth pointing out,
here left-liberals like Bird and me are in agreement with an
important strand of right-liberal thought.  As Charles Fried, a
representative of that strand, has said, “It is cheap and hypocritical
for society to be unwilling to pay the necessary lawyers from the tax
revenues of all, and then to claim that individual lawyers are morally
at fault for not choosing to work for free.”124
B.  The Worst of the Second Best: Mandatory Student Pro Bono
These self-defeating defenses of mandatory pro bono are not the
worst of the second best.  Indeed, even with this support, mandatory
pro bono itself has not really gotten off the ground; in fact, it is not a
condition of practicing law anywhere in the entire United States.125
As Deborah Rhode has wryly remarked, “Proposals for mandatory pro
bono requirements have come and gone, but mainly gone.”126  David
Luban, her co-author and fellow pro bono campaigner, is even more
pessimistic: “[M]andatory proposals have always been met with
hostility, and in my view the prospects for mandatory pro bono are so
dim that it is a waste of time to continue talking about it.”127
Not coincidentally, I suspect, calls for mandatory student pro bono
are on the rise.128  According to special American Association of Law
                                                          
123. Yarbrough v. Superior Court of Napa County, 702 P.2d 538, 590 (1985) (Bird, J.,
dissenting) (quoting King, J., concurring in the decision below).
124. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060, 1080 (1976).
125. See Murray, supra note 11, at 1146-47 (“Despite the abundance of mandatory pro bono
proposals, including one by the ABA, no state has adopted a comprehensive mandatory pro
bono requirement to date [1998].”).  But see Silverman, supra note 1, at 893 (describing several
limited court-ordered programs as forms of mandatory pro bono).
126. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 34, at 2416; see also Lardent, supra note 2, at
98-99 (describing typical course of unsuccessful mandatory pro bono proposal).
127. Luban, Faculty Pro Bono, supra note 39, at 58.
128. See Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 34, at 2416 (“This resistance [of the bar]
to required contributions, coupled with the limited success of voluntary efforts, has encouraged
more pro bono initiatives in the law schools.”); see also Murray, supra note 11, at 1167-73 (listing,
describing, and evaluating existing mandatory law school pro bono programs).
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Schools commission on pro bono and public service opportunities:
“Our central recommendation is that law schools make available to all law
students at least once during their law school careers a well-supervised law-
related pro bono opportunity and either require the students’ participation
or finds ways to attract the great majority of students to volunteer.”129
Mandatory student pro bono is much to be deplored--again, I
emphasize, from a left-liberal, social democratic perspective.  From
that perspective, its deficiencies fall under three principal heads: the
economic, the political, and the cultural.
Economically, the problem with mandatory student pro bono has
to do with progressivity.  Mandatory lawyer pro bono, as we have
already seen, is not a particularly progressive form of in-kind taxation,
because it almost certainly excludes from the tax base many who are
wealthy.  Mandatory student pro bono exacerbates this problem.  It
excludes from the tax base not only all non-lawyers, but also all
lawyers already in practice.  In so doing, it effectively taxes an already
improperly defined class precisely when they are likely to be least able
to pay--while they are still in professional training.  Lawyers per se, as
we have seen, are not a particularly attractive class to tax; law students
per se are a particularly appropriate class not to tax.
The political problem with mandatory student pro bono nicely
parallels the economic.  Just as law students, as such, are least able to
pay, so also, at that point in their career, do they have the least say in
their professional obligations.  Lawyers, through bar associations,
have substantial influence on the regulatory regime to which they are
subject; law students, by contrast, have relatively little say in law
school curricular requirements.  Thus, I suspect, it is no accident
that, while many law schools have mandatory student pro bono, no
integrated bar has mandatory lawyer pro bono.  Nor, I suspect, is it
any accident that, at my own institution, a majority of the law faculty
voted against mandatory faculty pro bono seconds after a vote in
favor of mandatory student pro bono.  Mandatory student pro bono,
in other words, is not merely regressive taxation; it is also taxation
without representation.  Left to their own device, students tend to
leave mandatory pro bono alone, or, like the rest of us, impose it only
on others.130  In what proved to be an embarrassingly frank
acknowledgement of this problem, a National Association for Public
                                                          
129. Learning to Serve: The Findings and Proposals of the AALS Commission on Pro Bono and Public
Service Opportunities 7 (Oct. 1999) (boldface and italic in original) [hereinafter AALS Report].
130. See Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 34, at 2439-40 (“Few student bodies have
voted in favor of pro bono requirements, and one that did, Columbia, opted to exclude itself
and to bind only future classes.”).
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Interest Law handbook urged promoters of mandatory law student
pro bono to avoid “the democracy trap” of submitting their proposal
to a vote of the student body.131
It is entirely possible, of course, to square the presence of
mandatory student pro bono with the absence of mandatory pro
bono for either law faculty or practicing lawyers.132  What makes
student pro bono requirements different, so this argument runs, is its
educational value.  Under this rationale, students are required to
perform pro bono work not because it meets the legal needs of the
poor, but because it meets the educational needs of the student.133  It
would be most unseemly of me to question the sincerity of this
argument.  But, even taking it on its face, note that it has an
interesting peculiarity: It is not clear how the educational benefits
would be lost if the students were paid.  Indeed, by paying students
for mandatory pro bono work, the political and economic objections
could be eliminated without, presumably, undercutting the
educational benefits.
Here, however, we must note a most significant division of the
assertedly educational benefits of mandatory student pro bono.
According to its proponents, the principal benefit is not to help
students appreciate the problems of the poor; it is, rather, to
inculcate into students their moral obligations as individual lawyers to
provide free legal service to the poor.134  The former learning
                                                          
131. Murray, supra note 11, at 1168 n.225.
132. For an argument in favor of faculty pro bono that parallels standard defenses of lawyer
pro bono, see Luban, Faculty Pro Bono, supra note 39, at 58; see also AALS Report, supra note 129,
at 17-19 (urging all law schools “to encourage and support” faculty pro bono service, in party by
adopting an “expectation” that each faculty member perform some such service each year).
133. See AALS Report, supra note 129, at 9 (“Law schools can justify adopting a required
program of service for their students on a ground that is unavailable for justifying required pro
bono service by members of the bar: law schools are, after all, responsible for the education of
their students.”); id. at 4 (“But law schools are primarily in the business of educating law
students, not in the business of providing direct public service, and it is the important
educational values of pro bono programs that justify the commitment of substantial law school
resources to their support.”); see also Rebecca A. Cochran, Legal Research and Writing Programs as
Vehicles for Law Student Pro Bono Service, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 429, 442-46 (1999) (setting forth
pro bono assignments as an excellent means of integrating the typical theoretical law school
curriculum with those practical skills associated with legal research and writing courses).  But see
Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 34, at 2443 (“[I]f the primary goal of a mandatory
[law school pro bono] program is to create a culture of commitment to public service, the
exempting faculty role models is counterproductive.”); Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional
Responsibilities of Professional Schools, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 32 (1999) [hereinafter Rhode,
Professional Schools] (suggesting that both students and teachers would benefit because pro bono
programs “provide many participants their only direct knowledge of how the system functions,
or fails to function, for the have-nots”); Deborah L. Rhode, FORWARD, AALS Report, supra note
129, at viii (“Pro bono work can also offer faculty and students a range of practical benefits.”).
134. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Legal Education and Social Responsibility, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
659, 661 (1985) (suggesting that clinical courses and pro bono activities in law school “can help
to develop a sense of civic and professional responsibility that recognizes that lawyers must
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experience would not be undercut by paying law students to
represent the poor; the latter, presumably, would.
We may well doubt the likelihood of persuading people to do
something voluntarily by forcing them to do it against their
considered objections.135  In this respect, mandatory student pro bono
is the law school equivalent of leading horses to water, making them
drink--and hoping they will learn to like the exercise.  Leaving that
aside, this tactic poses much deeper problems of pedagogical
principle, what I would call the cultural problem with mandatory
student pro bono.  It is one thing to require future lawyers to learn
the legal landscape, even those aspects of the legal landscape that
involve forcing people to act against their wills.  That, after all, is the
deep paradox, if not tragedy, that lies at the core of liberal law.  But it
is quite another thing to try, by coercive means, to make students--or
anyone else, for that matter--adopt any particular value as their own.
At the extreme, a liberal state may have to send its citizens to die in a
war they do not believe in, but it will not make them pledge
allegiance to the flag they must die under--at least as long as they are
                                                                                                                                     
assure the availability of legal assistance” and “can lead new lawyers to develop a habit of pro
bono service”); see also Fordham Conference Recommendations, supra note 89, at 1791 (“Law
schools, as the first socializers of law students into their professional role, have the opportunity
and the duty to make students aware of their professional responsibilities to serve low-income
persons.”); Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 829 (“It seems to be the virtually
uniform experience that exposure to the plight of the poor tends to breed in persons of good
will a commitment to their aid that in turn yields new efforts on their behalf.”); Rhode, Cultures
of Commitment, supra note 34, at 2413 (“An increasing number of schools have initiated pro
bono requirements for students” in order to “inspire an enduring commitment to public
service”); Rhode, Professional Schools, supra note 133, at 33 (“Ninety-five percent of deans
responding to the AALS Commission survey agreed that it is an important goal of law schools to
instill in students a sense of obligation to perform pro bono service”); AALS Report, supra note
129, at 4 (listing first among benefits of student pro bono help[ing] students develop a sense
that a responsible lawyer’s professional responsibilities include giving back to the community”).
135. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 782 (suggesting “at least an equal risk of an opposite
reaction. The draftee may well end up simply resenting the exaction.”); see also Cramton, supra
note 2, at 1133 (“[R]equirements that take the form of personal service are more likely to result
in angry or principled opposition.”); id. at 1138 (“[I]nducements and rewards are often more
efficacious in changing behavior than commands or threats of punishment.”); Lardent, supra
note 2, at 101 (“The argument that lawyers, once forced to provide services, inevitably will
embrace the cause of public service is not borne out by experience,” particularly that of
mandatory continuing legal education).  Cf. Rhode, Professional Schools, supra note 133, at 33
(“the limited data points in positive directions”); Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 34,
at 2434 (noting that evidence that public service requirements encourage future public service
is “thin but consistent”); id. at 2441 (“For these reluctant participants, client contact often
served to confirm adverse stereotypes of poverty communities.”); id. at 2431 (concluding, after a
survey of research on the origins of altruistic activity, that “well designed strategies by law
schools, bar associations, and law firms could significantly affect pro bono commitments,” but
cautioning that “the capacities of even the best designed programs should not be overstated”);
Abbe Smith, For Tom Joad and Tom Robinson: The Moral Obligation to Defend the Poor, 1997 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 869, 880-81 (noting not only the problem of already overburdened agencies
supervising law students, but also the lack of enthusiasm of law students conscripted into the
service of the indigent).
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in its schools.
Mandatory student pro bono poses other pedagogical, or cultural,
problems as well.  These can best be understood as what economists
call opportunity costs.  Even if we admit mandatory pro bono work to
have legitimate educational value, it necessarily comes at a cost of
other curricular opportunities (or sleep).136  Stated most starkly,
mandatory pro bono distracts students from their only real chance
for full-time formal legal education.  Law schools must, at a
minimum, ensure that their students are competent lawyers, in
command of both basic legal knowledge and basic legal skills.  Given
that necessity, what is most likely to be sacrificed to mandatory pro
bono requirements are precisely those courses in which the basic
assumptions behind our legal system are systematically explored, even
called into question.  It would be the ultimate travesty of liberal
education to sacrifice the questioning of the most basic values to the
inculcation of a single, much-debated duty.
III. TOWARD A UNITED FRONT OF LIBERALS FOR THE POOR: THE BEST
AS ALLY OF THE GOOD137
Where does my critique of pro bono publico proposals leave me as
a left-liberal, or social democratic, lawyer?  Though the formal studies
of the unmet need for lawyers may well be flawed in various ways, at
some point one must trust the evidence of one’s eyes: poor people
need lawyers, and much else besides; they need lawyers in particular,
because without lawyers they may not get much else, and they may
well lose what little they’ve got.  The reasons the poor have so little
have much to do with the complexities of an advanced capitalist
economy, and no more to do with the work of most lawyers than with
the work of any other vital component of such an economy.
The ideal social democratic solution would be to alleviate these
and other inevitable dislocations of the market by shifting resources
from its principal beneficiaries to its principal victims.  The classic
                                                          
136. Thus, in rejecting mandatory student pro bono, even as it recommended mandatory
lawyer pro bono, the Marrero Committee concluded that “[L]aw schools, here [in New York]
and in other states, would be pressured to offer client-oriented programs that they cannot
afford and that they might consider educationally undesirable in comparison to other
traditional and skills training courses.”  Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 835; see also
Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 34, at 2439 (“[G]ood pro bono programs require
substantial administrative resources.”).  See, e.g., Murray, supra note 11, at 1171 (“The sheer
amount of supervision required to successfully operate an efficient clinical or mandatory
student pro bono program simply makes resolution of the problem through a mandatory pro
bono program not only economically infeasible, but also prohibitively time consuming.”)
(citation omitted).
137. See Arcia, supra note 11, at 792-97.
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social democratic means of achieving this shifting is by progressive
taxes invested in safety nets like health care, social ladders like public
education, and, more recently, civil legal services.  In most of the
world’s liberal democracies today, these systems are alive and well; in
America in the last three decades, all of them have suffered, and the
last, civil legal services, has been critically wounded.  What’s worse,
given widespread lack of sympathy for the plight of the poor and
profound public distaste for lawyers, both carefully cultivated by
rightist politicians, the chance of increased public subsidy of the legal
needs of the poor in the short run is virtually nil.  And in the long
run, as the great Keynes reminded us, we’re all dead.
What, then, are we to do?  Faced with this grim reality, many of my
fellow travelers have hit upon mandatory lawyer pro bono as a second
best alternative to the social democratic ideal.  (And so, too--tellingly,
I believe--have others with no sympathy whatsoever for that ideal.)
For the reasons I have given, I find this turn deeply troubling.  But
doing nothing is a good deal worse, and criticizing the current effort
without proposing a better alternative, maybe worst still.  Accordingly,
in the first section of this final part, I address how to think about the
problem and, in the second, I offer a suggestion on what to do about
it.  I call my alternative to mandatory pro bono the Good Samaritan
Tax.  It is designed both to avoid the principal problems and thus to
move us closer to the social democratic ideal.
A. A Matter of Perspective: Considering the Possibility that We May Err, and
How
As Silverman pointed out, “The explicit debate over mandatory pro
bono proposals . . . has been heavily instrumental in character,
focusing on means rather than ends and incorporating key
assumptions.”138  Even opponents of mandatory pro bono tend to
assume that more subsidized legal services to the poor is a desirable
end.139  But, as conservative critics, particularly those relying on
economic analysis, have reminded us, that is only an intermediate
end.  We would do well to remember that, from a truly liberal
perspective, increased public funding for legal aid is itself only a
means to the higher end, helping the poor, that left-liberals share
with all, or virtually all, liberals and, thankfully, with many who are
emphatically not liberals.140
                                                          
138. Silverman, supra note 1, at 1056.
139. Silverman, supra note 1, at 1056.
140. See, e.g., Scully, supra note 2, at 1269 (emphatically embracing right-liberal position
against mandatory pro bono but agreeing that “[h]elping the indigent is an important social
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We would do well to remember the American origins of the kind of
subsidized legal services I, along with most other left-liberal
commentators, have recommended as the ideal.  The present Legal
Services Corporation had its origins in the aptly named Office of
Economic Opportunity.  The federal legislation creating the OEO
was quite explicit about its ultimate end: “to improve . . . living
conditions and develop skills necessary for a productive and self-
sufficient life in an increasingly complex and technological society.”141
And this end, it is worth pointing out, is essentially what Maimonides
identified as the highest form of charity: helping put our fellows back
on their feet, as fully functioning members of a shared
commonwealth.
This distinction between the intermediate end of enhanced legal
aid and the higher end of helping the poor is important in several
respects.  Most fundamentally, it helps distinguish precisely where we
might err from where error is simply not a possibility.  With respect to
the former, increasing legal aid to the poor, particularly certain kinds
of legal aid, may well be counterproductive.  Resources may be
diverted from programs that would benefit the poor more; political
backlashes or economic dislocations may reduce the share of the
poor rather than expand it; publicly subsidized ideological advocacy
on behalf of the poor may unacceptably compromise core liberal
values.  On these points, we need to listen carefully to the opposition,
especially those who can plausibly claim to have the interests of the
poor at heart.142
Having the interests of the poor at heart, on the other hand, is a
matter on which we simply cannot err.  Unlike many,143 I do not
                                                                                                                                     
goal”).
141. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Title III-B, Section 2861 (providing assistance to
migrant and other seasonally employed farmworkers).
142. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 979-84 (demonstrating why even publicly-spirited
legislators may hesitate to favor expanded governmental spending for legal services); id. at 1056
(“despite its ideological passion, the conservative critique has identified certain serious, if not
fundamental, problems”); id. at 1057-64 (analyzing efficiency concerns); id. at 1064-70
(analyzing distributive concerns); id. at 970 (“A self-righteous over-reliance on supposedly
obvious need-related facts, and on supposedly systematic but flawed scientific efforts, only
reduces prospects for a truly productive and resolving debate among interested parties with very
sharply competing points of view.”); see also Scully, supra note 2, at 1234 (“there is no necessary
connection between an increase in poverty and the need for increased legal services”).  Cf.
Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 843 (“That improving one aspect of the legal
system may worsen circumstances elsewhere in the process only points to the interrelationship
among the issues and the need for a comprehensive response to the entire problem, one that
would spread responsibility for corrective action to other segments of society.”).
143. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ.
Press 1st ed. 1971) (deriving his “maxi-min” principle from an idealized original socio-political
position); John Finnis, Natural Law and ‘Is’--‘Ought’ Question: an Invitation to Professor Veatch, in
NATURAL LAW 313 (Finnis, ed., 1981) (grounding care for the poor in a neo-Thomistic natural
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purport to ground my commitment to the poor on any sort of
objective proof; anything that rests on such proof is, at least in
principle, always subject to disproof.  Rather, I maintain that such
fundamental commitments cannot, in their very nature, be proved or
disproved.  In that sense, they are matters of faith, not reason, and
faith understood, not as that which ensures knowledge of unseen
truths, but as that to which one is most deeply devoted, what one
aspires to become and to make the world.  In committing ourselves to
the cause of the poor, in that sense, we simply cannot be wrong: That
is the kind of people we choose to be; that is the kind of world we
want to build.144
These two spheres--those that one can be mistaken about, and
those that lie at a deeper level, personally and theoretically, than
matters of rational proof--must both be borne in mind as we attend to
the legal needs of the poor.  Summarizing radically, our guiding
principle must be something like this: Given the priority of helping
the poor in our left-liberal constellation of commitments, and given
the undeniable fact of real poverty among us, we must immediately
support measures that offer reasonable promise of making the poor
better off.  On how much better off, in what ways, and at what costs,
we will of course disagree.145  But surely we agree that the poor
deserve adequate legal representation whenever their basic civil
rights and fundamental human needs are at stake.  As a corollary, we
must be willing to support measures to provide that representation,
even if those measures are not ideal.  On the other hand, we should
not support third-best measures when second-best measures are at
hand.  I offer the following proposal with those considerations firmly
in mind.146
B. A Pragmatic, Social Democratic Alternative: Implementing a Good
Samaritan Tax
The sorry state of the poor in our society cannot but remind us of
the plight the Good Samaritan remedied.  Innocently going about his
                                                                                                                                     
law).
144. See Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
145. And the “we” who decide should of course include our fellow citizens who are poor.
Complaints about our paternalism must certainly be heard.  See Scully, supra note 2, at 1235 (“If
given the option, the poor might very well prefer a cash payment in lieu of legal services.”).  But
these complaints ring particularly hollow when our prospective wards are children, the mentally
infirm, and fully consenting adults.
146. Others have suggested alternatives or complements to mandatory pro bono that also
could easily complement what I propose here.  See, e.g., supra, text at note 99 (loosening
restrictions on unauthorized practice).
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worldly work, he found a stranger robbed, beaten, and left for dead
in a wayside ditch.  He did what needed doing--took the stranger to a
wayside inn and paid for his care there--without apparent worry, or
ever awareness, that others had been better positioned to help.  And
such others there surely were.  Two high-status, and doubtlessly high-
income, members of the legal and religious establishment, a priest
and a Levite, had previously passed the needy stranger by, careful to
cross the road rather than come too close to unsightly human
suffering.
To my mind, this story contains at least the seed of the best
justification we are likely to find for a special lawyerly obligation to
help the poor: right now we can, no one else will, and waiting around
is out of the question.147  That, of course, is but a special application
of the Sunday school moral of the story: Everyone is your neighbor;
help them when you can (especially when no one else will).
But the teller of the story, the heretical Hebrew prophet, Joshua
ben Joseph, had more in mind.  He wanted his audience--ordinary,
working-class Jews--to notice two other, radically related, things.  First,
that the social and political leaders of their nation were falling down
on the job, not doing their most basic moral duty, in a word, not
practicing what they were preaching.  Second, relief could come--and,
at least in the story, did come--from a most unexpected source, the
lowly Samaritan, member of a mixed-race, religiously heterodox
social order much disparaged, on both counts, by the social and
political elite.  Thus, in moral terms at least, the last were already first
and the first, last.
Fitting, against that background, that lawyers take the next step in
remedying the legal needs of the poor.  In part, as we have already
seen, because we can.  But also, as I hope you will now agree, because
we have too long been political pariahs, easy effigies for the political
and religious right.  This point, of course, is dangerously close to the
image-polishing rationale of the current mandatory pro bono
                                                          
147. [W]e recognize that in times of crisis the efficiency and pragmatic objectives which the
Committee’s proposal would promote are not devoid of their own moral edge . . . .  Almost as a
given, when the crisis at hand affects justice and its adequate administration, and when the
people who would benefit the most from speedy and efficient remedies are the members of
society most in need, the moral imperatives of crafting a maximally useful response is
correspondingly enlarged.
     Marrero Committee Report, supra note 5, at 804. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 959 (“[I]t is
especially important for proponents to make the case for overwhelming need in scarcity
terms.”); id. at 1015 (“Since public treasury support, for a variety of reasons, has proven
inadequate to the task, it may be easier to justify imposing a special burden on the lawyers as a
kind of funding last resort.”) (citation omitted).  Cf. Alexander Forger, Mandatory Pro Bono, 74
A.B.A. J. 46, 47 (May 1, 1988) (“My feeling is that mandatory pro bono should be an absolute
last resort.”).
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crusade, and I have already joined those who condemn coercing
individual lawyers’ work to cultivate the bar’s general image.  My
program is different, I want to suggest, in a way that nicely parallels
the other lesson of the Good Samaritan tale.  My program would be
both structured and justified in ways designed to make clear, just as
Jesus’s parable did, not only who is doing the good work, but who is
not--and, by implication, who should be.
Here, in briefest outline, is how my Good Samaritan Tax would
work.  Instead of having to work a minimum number of hours for
poor people, lawyers would have to pay a special tax, designated as
such, to pay for lawyers for the poor.  The tax would be noticeably--
preferably, steeply--progressive; lawyers who earn more would have to
pay a higher percentage of their earnings.  Not, to return to the basic
rationale of the tax, because they have done more harm, or received
more benefit, but simply because they are the most able to pay.
CONCLUSION
I began by pointing out a paradox, if not by sounding a note of
pessimism: The currently most popular means of meeting the legal
needs of the poor, pro bono publico representation, has distracted us
from another means, publicly subsidized legal services, that is both
more efficient and more fair.  I have been at pains to show, in short,
how the good has tended to be the enemy of the best.  But I hope I
have concluded on a note of optimism.  The ancient goal of all
liberals--left and right, religious and secular--is, after all, caring for the
worst off among us.  If we reach out to each other, and re-focus our
attention on that common goal, I believe we can realistically expect
to build a better world for us all, but especially for those among us
who are poor.
